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IMMIGRATION LAW—ELIGIBILITY FOR  SECTION 212(C) RE­
LIEF FROM  DEPORTATION: IS  IT THE  GROUND OR THE  OFFENSE, 
THE DANCER OR THE DANCE?1 
INTRODUCTION 
Deportation is the removal of a lawful permanent resident, a 
legal noncitizen residing in the United States, from the country.2 
The corollary to this immigration procedure is the act of exclusion,3 
where a noncitizen is not allowed entry into the United States.4 
Currently, two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 govern the deportability and excludability of noncitizens.5 
1. In his poem, Among School Children, William Butler Yeats asks, “How can we 
know the dancer from the dance?” W.B. YEATS, SELECTED  POETRY 153 (Timothy 
Webb ed., 1991).  His question articulates the dilemma when watching a performance: 
whether the audience is watching the dancer—the obvious visual entertainment—or, 
rather, something below the surface—the dance or the artistic creation.  The poet illus­
trates just how difficult it is to separate the two.  Yeats’s question about creator versus 
creation parallels the issue in the current circuit split over eligibility for section 212(c) 
relief from deportation.  In determining whether a lawful permanent resident is eligible 
for section 212(c) relief, most federal circuits focus on the dancer—the language or text 
of the deportation grounds—while one circuit emphasizes the dance, the underlying 
facts of the offense charged.  In this legal dichotomy, it is the dancer that should win our 
attention. 
2. Congress enacted the term “removal” to refer to both “deportation” and “ex­
clusion.”  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -587 to -597; see  8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2006).  For purposes of this Note, both “deportation” and “exclu­
sion” will be used. 
3. Congress replaced the term “excludable” with “inadmissible” through the en­
actment of section 304(a)(3) of IIRIRA. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
(INA) § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225.  However, to maintain clarity in this Note, only the term 
“exclusion” will be used. 
4. “Immigration law features two parallel statutory schemes for regulating the 
movements of non-citizens.  One involves exclusion, or the process of excluding people 
who seek to enter the United States, while the other involves deportation, or the pro­
cess of expelling people who are already present in the country.”  Leal-Rodriguez v. 
INS, 990 F.2d 939, 942 (7th Cir. 1993). 
5. See INA § 237(a) (formerly § 241), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (listing the grounds for 
deportation); INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (listing the grounds for exclusion).  The 
Immigration and Nationality Act refers to legal noncitizens as “aliens.”  INA 
§ 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining alien as “any person not a citizen or na­
tional of the United States”).  While the term “noncitizen” is a broader category than 
immigrant—it is not exactly accurate since the immigrant is a citizen of some country— 
it is preferred in this Note because of the derogatory nature of the word “alien.” See 
Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Excep­
tionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 & n.1 (1999). 
417 
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Congress, however, has provided for discretionary relief from 
deportation or exclusion for lawful permanent residents6 (LPRs) in 
certain circumstances.7  In particular, from 1952 through 1996, 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), exclu­
sion could be waived pursuant to section 212(c).8  Specifically, sec­
tion 212(c) allowed the Attorney General discretion to waive 
exclusion for “[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an 
order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelin­
quished domicile of seven consecutive years.”9  Despite appearing 
clear on its face as pertaining to only those in exclusion proceed­
ings, starting as early as 1940, courts applied section 212(c) not only 
to those LPRs as specified in the statute but also to those LPRs 
who, but for some mistake of procedure, were placed in deportation 
proceedings when they should have been dealt with in exclusion 
proceedings.10  Courts found it critical that the LPR in deportation 
proceedings had actually departed the country and returned. 
6. A lawful permanent resident (LPR) is a noncitizen who has “been lawfully 
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant.” 
INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).  The United States Citizenship and Immigra­
tion Services (USCIS) defines an LPR as “[a]ny person not a citizen of the United 
States who is residing the [sic] in the U.S. under legally recognized and lawfully re­
corded permanent residence as an immigrant.  Also known as ‘Permanent Resident 
Alien,’ ‘Resident Alien Permit Holder,’ and ‘Green Card Holder.’”  USCIS, http:// 
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (click on “Resources,” then click on “Glossary” in the 
left-hand column and click on the letter “L”).  LPR status can be family sponsored, 
employment sponsored, or granted to refugees and asylees.  1 CHARLES  GORDON ET 
AL., IMMIGRATION  LAW AND  PROCEDURE § 1.03[2][e] (rev. ed. 2007).  LPRs are af­
forded the constitutional protection of procedural due process upon admission into the 
United States. Id. § 1.02[3][b].  Nonresident noncitizens, those who are lawfully present 
on a temporary basis such as students or temporary workers, are not the subject of this 
Note. See id. § 1.03[2][e][iii] (explaining temporary immigrant visas).  Neither are “un­
documented” or “illegal” immigrants who have entered the country without permission 
or overstayed a temporary visa. Id. 
7. Between 1952 and 1996 deportation could be waived pursuant to section 
244(a)(1).  INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996).  Section 244 
granted relief for anyone who had been physically present in the United States for a 
continuous period of at least seven years, who proved that during all of such period he 
was and remained a person of good moral character, and who was a person whose 
deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship. 
Id.  Current forms of discretionary relief include cancellation of removal, INA § 240A, 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006); asylum, INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; non-refoulement, INA 
§ 241b(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); and voluntary departure, INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229c. 
8. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
9. Id. 
10. See infra Part II.A. 
419 
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After years of granting relief in this manner, the Second Cir­
cuit, in Francis v. INS, held, based on equal protection grounds, 
that section 212(c) relief was available to those deportees similarly 
situated to excludees but who had not departed from and returned 
to the United States.11  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
subsequently held, in accordance with Francis, that deportable 
LPRs who were similarly situated to excludable LPRs must be 
treated equally with respect to their applications for section 212(c) 
relief.12 
About twenty years later, during the 1990s, Congress began to 
reshape the focus of immigration law.13  Among the changes, the 
legislature both narrowed the class of noncitizens to whom section 
212(c) relief applied and broadened the grounds for which non­
citizens could be deported.14  Then, in 1996, Congress repealed sec­
tion 212(c), replacing it with section 240A(a).15  After some 
11. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 269-71 (2d Cir. 1976). 
12. In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976). 
13. See Brent Asseff, Note, Reinstatement of Removal and IIRIRA Retroactivity 
After Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales: Restoring Section 212(c) Discretion and Fairness to 
Immigration Law, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 157, 158 (2007) (“The 1990s was another 
period during which society and politics expressed a growing resentment toward immi­
grants.”); Anthony Distinti, Note, Gone but Not Forgotten: How Section 212(c) Relief 
Continues to Divide Courts Presiding over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2809, 2821 (2006) (“The 1990s witnessed a growing societal resentment toward 
aliens in the United States.  The animosity spiked after the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing and the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing.  Congress reacted to public pressure by 
passing AEDPA and IIRIRA.”); Jacqueline P. Ulin, Note, A Common Sense Recon­
struction of the INA’s Crime-Related Removal System: Eliminating the Caveats from the 
Statue of Liberty’s Welcoming Words, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1549, 1555-56 (2000) (“In the 
1990s, Congress continued to target aliens as part of its anti-crime agenda.”).  For a 
discussion on the relationship between immigration control, crime control, and national 
security, see Jennifer M. Chacon, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Re­
strictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007). 
14. See Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 
Stat. 4978, 5052 (amending section 212(c) so that any LPR convicted of an aggravated 
felony who had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years was not eligible for 
relief); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (barring LPRs with aggravated felony convic­
tions, drug convictions, certain weapons convictions, among others, from applying for 
section 212(c) relief and removing the five-year time served qualification); Illegal Immi­
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597 (repealing section 212(c) relief altogether); IIRIRA 
§ 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (redefining and broadening the term “aggravated felony” 
to include many new offenses, some of which are misdemeanors and low-level felonies). 
15. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  In 1996, IIRIRA created “removal pro­
ceedings,” found at INA section 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), by combining exclusion and 
deportation proceedings, formerly found at INA section 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), and 
INA section 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a), respectively. See Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 96 
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uncertainty whether the repeal of section 212(c) applied retroac­
tively, the Supreme Court held that section 212(c) relief was not 
repealed for certain LPRs in deportation proceedings in progress 
before the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im­
migrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).16 
This Note focuses on how the courts determine whether LPRs, 
particularly those subject to deportation under the more recently 
defined aggravated felony ground, are eligible for section 212(c) re­
lief.  With the advent of the equal protection holdings mentioned 
earlier, this threshold question of eligibility has become a pivotal 
part in the path to section 212(c) relief from deportation. 
However, in applying this equal protection framework for eli­
gibility, a circuit split has arisen.  The split revolves around what it 
means for an LPR in deportation proceedings to be similarly situ­
ated to an LPR in exclusion proceedings, particularly when deport­
able for an aggravated felony.  Two approaches have emerged when 
asking whether a deportee is similarly situated to an excludee.17 
These approaches are similar in nature but differ in the detail. 
The majority of courts of appeals follow the comparable-
grounds approach, which finds support in federal regulation, admin­
istrative and federal case law, and statutory interpretation.18  Under 
this approach, courts compare the petitioner’s ground for deporta­
tion in section 237(a) (former section 241) to the grounds for exclu­
sion listed under section 212(a).  If the deportation ground has a 
n.6 (2d Cir. 2007).  Currently, subsections (a) and (b) of 240A, collectively titled “can­
cellation of removal,” allow for the Attorney General to exercise discretion in granting 
relief to LPRs in deportation and exclusion proceedings so long as certain requirements 
are satisfied. Id.  Congress has expressly denied any discretion to cancel the removal of 
an aggravated felon. Id. 
16. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315-20 (2001); see infra Part II.C. 
17. The author readily acknowledges the development of a three-way split among 
the circuits. See Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per 
curiam).  Upon reevaluating its precedent, the Ninth Circuit has taken a different route 
altogether by rejecting Francis and eliminating the statutory-counterpart test. Id. at 
1207.  Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s third option is to not offer section 212(c) relief 
to deportable LPRs who have not left the country.  Because this rationale is so distinct 
from the issues discussed in this Note, the Abebe decision will be addressed minimally. 
See infra Part III.B.3. 
18. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1.  In 2004, 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) codified the 
nomenclature of the comparable-grounds approach as the statutory-counterpart test.  8 
C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2009).  Though it is now properly known as the statutory-coun­
terpart test, for purposes of this Note, the terms “comparable grounds” and “statutory 
counterpart” will be used interchangeably. 
421 
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“counterpart” in the exclusion provision, then the grounds are com­
parable and the petitioner is eligible for relief.19 
But in 2007, in Blake v. Carbone, the Second Circuit employed 
its own offense-specific approach to determine eligibility, focusing 
on the underlying offense of an LPR’s deportation charge to answer 
whether the LPR was similarly situated to an excludee.20  The court 
premised its approach on its previous decision, Francis v. INS, de­
scribed above.  To satisfy the equal protection concerns of Francis, 
the court remanded to determine whether the petitioners’ certain 
aggravated felonies could form the basis of the crime involving 
moral turpitude (CIMT) ground for exclusion.21 
Upon review of both approaches, it is apparent that the Second 
Circuit impermissibly expanded the reach of Francis, creating the 
unnecessary step of evaluating a petitioner’s underlying offense. 
Though compelling, the Second Circuit’s reliance on Francis is 
flawed.  In evaluating these flaws it becomes clear that the majority 
approach is best and, in fact, the concern for equal protection is 
unfounded. 
In contrast, the comparable-grounds approach continues to sat­
isfactorily address the question of section 212(c) eligibility.  This 
majority approach serves as an effective, consistent, and fair way to 
determine section 212(c) eligibility.  This Note contends that, ab­
sent congressional action, the majority of courts of appeals follow 
the proper approach in determining whether an LPR is eligible for 
section 212(c) relief from deportation.  The comparable-grounds 
approach, codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) as the statutory-coun­
terpart rule, is preferred because it comports with legislative intent 
and administrative policy.  Moreover, it promotes uniformity and 
avoids adding further confusion to the section 212(c) eligibility 
analysis. 
Part I of this Note provides a short overview of removal.  Part 
II discusses the history of the section 212(c) waiver.  Part III exam­
ines the circuit split and briefly addresses a recent Ninth Circuit 
decision, which departs from both approaches at issue in this Note. 
19. See, e.g., In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 726 (B.I.A. 2005) (“[W]hether the 
deportation ground under which the [LPR] has been adjudged deportable has a statu­
tory counterpart among the exclusion grounds waivable by section 212(c).” (quoting In 
re Jimenez-Santillano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 567, 574 (B.I.A. 1996)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), vacated sub nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88. 
20. 489 F.3d 88, 103. 
21. Id. at 104.  The court described its decision as merely “confined to the equal 
protection principle articulated in Francis.” Id. 
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Lastly, Part IV puts forth the argument that the comparable-
grounds approach properly applies the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection per Francis, promotes the policies of uniformity 
and efficiency, and upholds long-standing administrative and judi­
cial precedent, therefore making it the correct approach for deter­
mining section 212(c) eligibility. 
I. REMOVAL 
A. Congressional Plenary Power 
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly 
grant Congress authority over immigration, it does grant Congress 
broad powers in the immigration context.  The main sources of fed­
eral power over immigration include the Naturalization Clause,22 
the Migration or Importation Clause,23 and the War Powers 
Clause.24  Congress is also vested with the power to control immi­
gration via the intrinsic right of a sovereign to control its borders.25 
It is well understood that Congress holds the exclusive authority to 
design immigration policy.26 
Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that Congress’s authority to 
prescribe grounds for expelling resident aliens is “plenary” and 
stated that a resident’s stay in this country is one of “permission and 
tolerance.”27  Thus, the congressional right to deport noncitizens “is 
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent 
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (vesting in Congress the power “[t]o establish an 
uniform rule of naturalization”). 
23. Id. § 9, cl. 1 (pertaining to limits on “[t]he migration and importation of such 
persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit”). 
24. Id. § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare war). 
25. See Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (“The right to expel aliens is a 
sovereign power, necessary to the safety of the country, and only limited by treaty obli­
gations in respect thereto entered into with other governments.”); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The right to exclude or to expel all aliens [is] 
. . . an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation . . . .”); 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604-07 
(1889) (stating that Congress has absolute power to exclude legal aliens when required 
by public interest to protect the country’s security and autonomy); see also 1 GORDON 
ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.03[4][a]. R 
26. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (stating that Congress’s control over 
immigration policies “has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judi­
cial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government”). 
27. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952); see Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222 (1961); see 
also McJunkin v. INS, 579 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Congress possesses plenary 
power over immigration and may impose conditions upon the privilege of remaining in 
this country which could not be imposed upon citizens.” (citation omitted)). 
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their entrance.”28  By 1893, the Supreme Court made clear that, 
from a policy perspective, deportation was justified “simply because 
[the LPR’s] presence is deemed inconsistent with the public wel­
fare, and without any punishment being imposed or contemplated, 
either under the laws of the country out of which he is sent or under 
those of the country to which he is taken.”29 
B. Short History of Removal 
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 provided for the deporta­
tion of noncitizens, giving the President the power to deport (1) 
resident aliens who maintained citizenship of a country at war with 
the United States (enemy aliens),30 (2) any alien whom the Presi­
dent considered a threat to the peace and safety of the country,31 
and (3) any alien in prison.32  Besides the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
28. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713-14; see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (stating that the power to exclude or deport aliens is 
“largely immune from judicial control”); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 607­
09 (explaining the sovereign power of the government to exclude people from the 
United States). 
29. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 709.  Some scholars argue that deportation is in 
fact punishment for lawful permanent residents akin to that of the penal system. See 
Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Criminal-Civil Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to 
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 289 (2008); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sov­
ereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Note, Was the Su­
preme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 
21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29 (2003); see also Peter H. Schuck, The Transfor­
mation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24-27 (1984).  Though not discussed 
in this Note, it is helpful to understand the opposing arguments in this debate.  The civil 
and administrative argument states that because the “deportee is not being indicted, 
tried, and sentenced for [a] crime . . . expulsion is simply a protective measure to rid the 
United States of aliens deemed undesirable, and that in any event the deportee is 
merely being sent back to his country of origin and allegiance.”  6 GORDON ET AL., 
supra note 6, § 71.01[4][a]–[c].  The criminal argument contends that so long as the R 
deportee is not a recent arrival to the country, then the no-punishment argument lacks 
standing because the alien has likely established roots in the United States for many 
years. Id.; see, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (“[D]eportation may 
deprive the non-citizen ‘of all that makes life worth living.’” (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. 
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922))); Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1527 (3d Cir. 
1996) (Sarokin, J., concurring) (“The legal fiction that deportation following a criminal 
conviction is not punishment is difficult to reconcile with reality, especially in the con­
text of [longtime LPRs].”).  Nevertheless, under current law deportation is considered 
civil and administrative, not criminal. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, § 71.01[4][a]. R 
30. Alien Enemy Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577, 577-78 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006)). 
31. Alien Friends Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570-72 (expired 1800). 
32. Id.; see Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Act of June 18, 
1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802). 
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the nation’s first one hundred years consisted of unrestricted immi­
gration.33  The country’s need for labor as a developing nation was 
its main purpose behind this open-door policy.34  Eventually, in 
1875, Congress did invoke its power over immigration by passing its 
first restrictive statute barring the admission of convicts and 
prostitutes.35 
In 1882, Congress enacted laws aimed at immigrants from 
China.  The Chinese Exclusion Acts restricted immigration of Chi­
nese laborers for ten years and the admittance of Chinese residents 
to citizenship.36  In 1891, Congress added, in conjunction with its 
exclusion laws, a deportation statute limited to “any alien who shall 
come into the United States in violation of law.”37  Then in 1907, 
Congress passed a deportation statute with respect to a noncitizen’s 
conduct after she had made a lawful entry into the United States.38 
In 1917, Congress revised and passed a new set of immigration laws 
and in the 1920s created further restrictions.39  The laws remained 
the same until the enactment of the INA in 1952.40 
C. Grounds for Removal 
The INA specifies the grounds under which an LPR may be 
excluded or deported.41  If a noncitizen is seeking entry to the 
United States and falls under a provision of section 212(a), then the 
noncitizen is “ineligible to be admitted to the United States.”42 
33. 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.02[1]. R 
34. Id. 
35. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78. 
36. Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Chi­
nese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. 
37. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086. 
38. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900 (making deportable any 
noncitizen who was a prostitute “at any time within three years after she shall have 
entered the United States”). 
39. See Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874; see, e.g., Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 
190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159-160. 
40. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)). 
41. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (grounds for exclusion); INA § 237(a), 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (grounds for deportation).  While the grounds for exclusion and de­
portation are enumerated separately, because Congress recently adopted the term “re­
moval” to describe both exclusion and deportation, both sets of grounds are now 
generally referred to as “grounds for removal.” See supra note 2.  For purposes of this R 
Note, these grounds will be referred to separately. 
42. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).  Currently there are forty-six grounds 
for exclusion. Id.  The following three categories include these grounds: (1) Health and 
Related Grounds, (2) Criminal and Related Grounds (most relevant to this Note), and 
(3) Security and Related Grounds.  INA § 212(a)(1)–(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(3). 
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However, after an initial lawful admission, if an LPR residing in the 
United States commits an act provided for in section 237(a), then 
the LPR is subject to deportation.43  Some of the exclusionary and 
deportation categories overlap; however, certain acts amount only 
to grounds for deportation, while others only exclusion.44 
II. HISTORY OF SECTION 212(C) RELIEF 
A. The Precursor to Section 212(c) Relief: 1917 
The first form of discretionary relief is found in the seventh 
proviso of section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917.45  Section 3 of 
the Act focused on the exclusion of noncitizens only.46  However, 
the seventh proviso allowed the Secretary of Labor47 to admit cer­
tain noncitizens in exclusion proceedings to the United States.48 
These noncitizens were those returning to their permanent U.S. res­
idence of at least seven consecutive years after a temporary trip 
abroad.49 
In 1940, in In re L—, upon certification from the BIA, the At­
torney General first expanded the applicability of the seventh pro­
viso to deportation proceedings.50  In weighing the equitable 
concerns for Mr. L—, a noncitizen from Yugoslavia, the Attorney 
43. See INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).  Congress has enumerated thirty-three 
grounds for deportation, which are distributed among six categories: (1) Inadmissible at 
Time of Entry or of Adjustment of Status or Violates Status, (2) Failure to Register and 
Falsification of Documents, (3) Security and Related Grounds, (4) Public Charge 
Grounds, (5) Unlawful Voting, and (6) Criminal Offenses.  INA § 237(a)(1)–(6), 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)-(6). 
44. While the grounds in each provision may be similar, they are not identical. 
Both contain criminal and noncriminal bases for removal, but the consequences of a 
criminal offense may be more serious in both the deportation proceedings itself and 
beyond. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, § 71.01[4][c]. R 
45. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78. 
46. Id. 
47. The Secretary of Labor originally held the role of overseeing immigration 
matters.  The shift in administration to the Attorney General was made for national 
security reasons. See Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., The Administration of U.S. Immigration 
Policy: Time for Another Change, 4 SOC. CONT. 192, 195 (1994), available at http://www. 
thesocialcontract.com/pdf/four-three/briggs.pdf (discussing the history of the adminis­
tration of U.S. immigration policy). 
48. Immigration Act of 1917 § 3 (“[A]liens returning after a temporary absence 
to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven consecutive years may be admit­
ted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, and under such conditions as he may 
prescribe . . . .”). 
49. Id. 
50. In re L—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 1940). 
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General used his discretion nunc pro tunc51 and granted relief.52 
Mr. L— was convicted of a CIMT (larceny), which, under the law 
at that time, made him excludable but not deportable.53  He later 
temporarily traveled abroad to visit family; upon return, immigra­
tion officers overlooked Mr. L—’s excludability and admitted him 
into the country.54  A few months later, Mr. L— was placed in de­
portation proceedings because of his earlier CIMT conviction.55 
Under this scheme, Mr. L— technically did not have discretionary 
relief available to him because the seventh proviso only applied to 
those in exclusionary proceedings.56  However, the Attorney Gen­
eral determined that relief should be available to Mr. L— because 
it would have been available to him had he been properly put in 
exclusionary proceedings when he returned to the United States.57 
The Attorney General recognized that to deny Mr. L— relief from 
deportation would have been to deny him solely on a technicality, 
and “[n]o policy of Congress could possibly be served by such irra­
tional result.”58  Critical to his analysis, the Attorney General held 
that sections 3 and 19 (the grounds for exclusion and deportation, 
respectively) “must be read together.”59  In essence, he compared 
both grounds and found that because of their similarity, a “correc­
tive exercise” of authority under the seventh proviso was proper.60 
51. “Nunc pro tunc relief is a legal fiction that corrects the erroneous denial of 
relief in the past by providing such relief now.”  Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 94 n.5 
(2d Cir. 2007) (citing Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 308 (2d Cir. 2004)). Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines nunc pro tunc as “[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court’s 
inherent power.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (9th ed. 2009).  The concept can be 
thought of as “now for then.” Id. See generally Tammy W. Hui, Note, The Case for 
Nunc Pro Tunc Adjudication of Section 212(c) Applications Wrongfully Denied Based 
on an Erroneous Legal Interpretation, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 589 (2008). 
52. In re L—, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 5-6. 
53. Id. at 1-3.  Mr. L— was excludable under section 3 of the Immigration Act of 
1917, which excluded “persons who have been convicted of . . . a felony or other crime 
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”  Immigration Act of 1917 § 3. 
54. In re L—, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 2. 
55. Id. at 1-2.  Mr. L— was deportable under section 19 of the Immigration Act 
of 1917 as a noncitizen “convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude prior to entry 
into the United States.” Id. at 4. 
56. Id. at 5. 
57. Id. at 5-6. 
58. Id. at 5. 
59. Id. at 6. 
60. Id.; see In re A—, 2 I. & N. Dec. 459, 462-63 (B.I.A. 1946) (granting seventh 
proviso relief where a close connection existed between the ground for deportation and 
corresponding ground for exclusion thereby allowing petitioner to depart the United 
States and return so exclusion could be waived); cf. In re M—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 642, 647 
(B.I.A. 1954) (denying section 212(c) relief from deportation for entry without inspec­
tion because of a lack of a corresponding ground of exclusion); In re T—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 
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By granting what “amount[ed] to little more than a correction of a 
record of entry,” the Attorney General made the landmark decision 
to provide relief from deportation via the seventh proviso.61 
B. Section 212(c): 1952–1976 
In 1952, Congress compiled all the immigration laws from 1798 
through the 1920s into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952.62  With the enactment of the INA, what was once the seventh 
proviso became section 212(c).63  Like its predecessor, section 
212(c) only governed exclusionary proceedings.64  Yet the BIA con­
tinued with its pre-1952 practice of extending relief to the deporta­
tion context in certain circumstances.65 
In 1956, in In re G—A—, the BIA first granted section 212(c) 
relief to a Mexican LPR who pled guilty to an excludable offense, 
departed temporarily, returned to the United States, and was then 
placed in deportation proceedings.66  Based on In re L—, the BIA 
allowed the LPR to apply for section 212(c) relief nunc pro tunc.67 
The BIA found the LPR eligible, reasoning that because the LPR 
would have been eligible for section 212(c) relief had he been prop­
erly placed in exclusionary proceedings upon reentry, he should be 
eligible for such relief in later deportation proceedings regardless of 
the statute’s plain language.68  For about the next twenty years the 
389, 390 (B.I.A. 1953) (denying section 212(c) relief from deportation for immigration 
document fraud because of a lack of a corresponding ground of exclusion). 
61. In re L—, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 6. 
62. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)). 
63. INA § 212(c), 66 Stat. at 187 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994)), repealed 
by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, div. C, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597; see Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270­
71 (2d Cir. 1976). 
64. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. §1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996) (providing that relief 
is available to those LPRs “not under an order of deportation”). 
65. See, e.g., In re G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274, 276 (1956); In re F—, 6 I. & N. 
Dec. 537, 538-39 (B.I.A. 1955); In re S—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392, 393 (B.I.A. 1954; Att’y 
Gen. 1955). 
66. In re G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 274-75. 
67. Id. at 276.  Interestingly, despite a seeming requirement for travel abroad, in 
In re Smith, section 212(c) relief was extended to deportation proceedings for an LPR 
requesting adjustment of status.  11 I. & N. Dec. 325, 327 (1965).  The court reasoned 
that there was “no valid reason for denying him the benefits of section 212(c) on the 
technical ground that he is not returning to the United States after a voluntary depar­
ture.” Id. 
68. See In re G—A—, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 276; see also Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 
88, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (“According to the BIA, a [section] 212(c) waiver should be availa­
ble to lawful permanent residents who commit an excludable offense in the United 
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availability of section 212(c) discretionary relief was limited to 
those LPRs, like Mr. L— and Mr. G—A—, who had actually de­
parted, returned to the country, and then faced deportation.69  For 
example, in In re Arias-Uribe, the BIA held that the nunc pro tunc 
discretion afforded in In re L— did not apply because the LPR had 
never left the country and therefore would never have been subject 
to exclusionary proceedings.70  The situation of an error in the re­
cord of entry discussed in In re L— had not occurred.  While ac­
knowledging that the scope of section 212(c) had already been 
extended beyond its plain meaning, the BIA did not want to go 
further and grant relief to an LPR who had not physically left the 
United States.71  To support this conclusion, the BIA referenced a 
change in language from the seventh proviso to section 212(c) that 
illustrated Congress’s intent to require an actual departure and re­
turn to the United States.72 
In 1976, however, the Second Circuit effectively eliminated this 
physical-departure limitation on section 212(c) eligibility.73  In 
Francis v. INS, the court expanded the reach of section 212(c) to 
certain noncitizens who had not traveled outside the United 
States.74  Francis permanently resided in the United States for ten 
years but was found deportable after being convicted of a drug 
charge.75  He sought section 212(c) relief, the BIA denied his appli­
cation, and he appealed to the Second Circuit.76  Francis argued 
that section 212(c), as applied by the BIA, created two identical 
classes of aliens, except that, in one class, members departed and 
returned to the United States at some point after they became de­
portable while members in another class never left.77  This applica­
tion, he argued, deprived him of his constitutional right to equal 
States, depart and return to the United States after commission of the offense, have not 
been put in exclusion proceedings upon return, but later end up in deportation 
proceedings.”). 
69. See, e.g., In re Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696, 698 (B.I.A. 1971), aff’d sub 
nom. Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
70. Id. at 697-98. 
71. Id. at 698. 
72. Id. at 700.  The language changed from requiring the LPR to have “return[ed] 
after a temporary absence” to requiring the LPR to have “temporarily proceed[ed] 
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation.” Id. at 699 & n.2. 
73. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976). 
74. See id. 
75. Id. at 269. 
76. Id. at 270. 
77. Id. at 272. 
429 
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protection of the laws.78  The Second Circuit agreed, concluding 
that the distinction was not rationally related to any legitimate pur­
pose of the statute.79 
The court further stated that the statute, as applied, violated 
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by limit­
ing discretion to those who temporarily traveled abroad and not 
considering those similarly situated but who had not left the coun­
try.80  “Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent resident 
aliens who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortui­
tous factors, be treated in a like manner.”81  Rather than strike the 
statute, the Second Circuit further extended the reach of section 
212(c) by making relief from deportation “available to deportable 
[LPRs] who differ[ ] from excludable [LPRs] only in terms of a re­
cent departure from the country.”82 
A few months later, in In re Silva, the BIA adopted the Francis 
holding.83  As a result, section 212(c) relief became available to 
those in deportation proceedings who had never traveled outside 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 272-73.  The Second Circuit applied the “minimal scrutiny test” requir­
ing that “distinctions between different classes of persons ‘must be reasonable, not arbi­
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall 
be treated alike.’” Id. at 272 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975)).  Note 
that “all individuals in the United States—citizens and aliens alike—are protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. . . . However, [f]ederal authority in the 
areas of immigration and naturalization is plenary.  Accordingly, federal classifications 
based on alienage are subject to relaxed scrutiny.”  Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 
1190 (9th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
80. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 272 n.5, 272-73.  The court reasoned that “an alien 
whose ties with this country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial 
entry should receive at least as much consideration as an individual who may leave and 
return from time to time.” Id.; see also Elwin Griffith, The Road Between the Section 
212(c) Waiver and Cancellation of Removal Under Section 240A of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act—The Impact of the 1996 Reform Legislation, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 
94 n.211 (1997) (explaining that there is no specific Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth 
Amendment, but it does forbid discrimination that violates due process, thereby creat­
ing the connection between the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
81. Francis, 532 F.2d at 273.  The court further stated, “We do not dispute the 
power of the Congress to create different standards of admission and deportation for 
different groups of aliens.  However, . . . individuals within a particular group may not 
be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to any legitimate gov­
ernmental interest.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
82. See Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). 
83. In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976). 
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the United States.84  Immigration courts were thus tasked with con­
sidering the merits of petitions for relief from deportees similarly 
situated to excludees.85 
With the equal protection framework in place, it became diffi­
cult to determine whether a deportable LPR was similarly situated 
to an excludable LPR.86  As a result, courts found it necessary to 
evaluate the grounds for deportation and exclusion; the analysis re­
quired a determination that they be comparable and that the 
ground of deportation could be found in the grounds for exclu­
sion.87  The BIA settled on the comparable-grounds approach to 
guide immigration judges in their equal protection determination.88 
By comparing the petitioner’s ground of deportation to the enu­
merated grounds of exclusion, the BIA was better able to discern 
which petitioners met the equal protection mandate set out in Fran­
cis and Silva.89 
Towards the end of this time period, Congress established the 
aggravated felony ground of deportation, which at that point in­
cluded only murder, drug trafficking, and weapons trafficking.90 
The number of aggravated felony grounds increased during the rush 
of legislation in the 1990s.91  Importantly, as the number and types 
increased, the grounds of exclusion did not.  Thus, for determining 
84. Id. (“In light of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal pro­
tection of the law, it is our position that no distinction shall be made between perma­
nent resident aliens who temporarily proceed abroad and non-departing permanent 
resident aliens.”). 
85. See id. 
86. Blake, 489 F.3d at 95. 
87. See, e.g., In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184 (B.I.A. 1984); In re Granados, 
16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (B.I.A. 1979), abrogated by In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182. 
88. Blake, 489 F.3d at 95; see Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 
2007), reh’g en banc sub nom. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam) (“[T]he BIA has resisted further departures from the statutory text and consist­
ently held that relief is available only for aliens facing deportation on a ground with 
some tight connection to a ground of excludability that could have been waived under 
§ 212(c) had the alien traveled abroad.”). 
89. See infra Part III.A for a more detailed look at how the comparable-grounds 
test evolved and changed in light of the aggravated felony ground of deportation. 
90. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4469 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)); see Abebe, 493 F.3d at 
1099-1100 n.10 (“The ‘aggravated felony’ deportation ground was created by the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (‘ADAA’) and was defined narrowly to include murder, drug 
trafficking, and weapons trafficking.  Since that time, the number of offenses classified 
as aggravated felonies has exploded.” (citations omitted)). 
91. See infra notes 96, 101, and accompanying text. R 
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section 212(c) eligibility, a discrepancy was created that the courts 
had to reconcile in their analyses.92 
C. Section 212(c): 1990–2004 
The 1990s ushered in a new era of immigration law.  A large 
policy shift occurred in an attempt to rid the country of criminal 
noncitizens and threats of terrorism.93  As part of that shift, Con­
gress enacted various amendments limiting the reach of section 
212(c) and ultimately repealing it in total.94  First, in 1990, the Im­
migration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) removed eligibility for section 
212(c) relief for any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony 
who served five years or more in prison.95  Next, in 1996, the Anti­
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) elimi­
nated eligibility for section 212(c) relief for any LPR rendered 
deportable because of an aggravated felony conviction regardless of 
length of the sentence.96  AEDPA also expanded the definition of 
aggravated felony to include many more criminal offenses, which 
further narrowed eligibility for 212(c) relief.97 
Several months later, Congress passed IIRIRA, which included 
an amendment that ended section 212(c) relief for proceedings 
commenced on or after April 1, 1997.98  Another amendment en­
acted the new form of discretionary relief titled “cancellation of re­
moval,” which has a much narrower framework for eligibility than 
92. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felonies). 
In Blake v. Carbone, the petitioners made multiple arguments including the argument 
that “their aggravated felony ground of deportation has a counterpart in the ground of 
exclusion for crimes of moral turpitude because all aggravated felonies are crimes of 
mortal turpitude, or, in the alternative, their individual aggravated felonies could form 
the basis of a ground of exclusion.” Blake, 489 F.3d at 100.  The Second Circuit agreed 
with their alternative argument. Id. at 104.  For informational purposes, the present 
removal provision states that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at 
any time after admission is” removable.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Conviction is defined at INA § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(48)(A). 
93. See supra note 13. R 
94. Blake, 489 F.3d at 96. 
95. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052. 
96. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277.  Drug convictions, multiple CIMTs, certain weapon 
charges, and national security violations were also included in this broader list of of­
fenses. Id. 
97. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, § 74.04(i)(b). R 
98. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, div. C, §§ 304(b), 309(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597, -626. 
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did section 212(c).99  For example, LPRs convicted of an aggravated 
felony are ineligible for cancellation of removal.100  And, like 
AEDPA, IIRIRA redefined “aggravated felony” by adding more 
offenses to the list.101  Moreover, Congress made this new defini­
tion retroactive so that it applied to crimes committed both before 
and after the effective date of IIRIRA.102 
IIRIRA, however, was unclear regarding the retroactive effect 
of the repeal of section 212(c).103  Accordingly, the BIA and federal 
courts had room for interpretation.104  In 1997, in In re Soriano, the 
99. IIRIRA sec. 304(a)(3), § 240A(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b (2006)); see Paul B. Hunker III, Cancellation of Removal or Cancellation of 
Relief?—The 1996 IIRIRA Amendments: A Review and Critique of Section 240A(a) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2 (2000). 
100. INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). 
101. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (as amended by IIRIRA § 321(a)). 
“[T]he definition of what constitutes an aggravated felony has steadily grown and now 
includes conduct that is neither ‘aggravated’ nor ‘felonious,’ as those words are com­
monly understood. . . . [S]everal misdemeanors, including shoplifting and simple bat­
tery, are now considered aggravated felonies for purposes of the INA.”  William J. 
Johnson, Note, When Misdemeanors Are Felonies: The Aggravated Felony of Sexual 
Abuse of a Minor, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 419, 424 (2007-2008) (footnote omitted). 
Much scholarship has been published regarding the various aggravated felony 
grounds and the issues related to them. See, e.g., Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in 
Congressional Fishnets—Immigration Law’s New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 589 (1998); Melissa Cook, Note, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Fel­
ony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293 (2003); Natalie Liem, Note, Mean What You Say, Say What 
You Mean: Defining the Aggravated Felony Deportation Grounds to Target More than 
Aggravated Felons, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1071 (2007); Valerie Neal, Note, Slings and Arrows 
of Outrageous Fortune: The Deportation of “Aggravated Felons,” 36 VAND. J. TRANS­
NAT’L L. 1619 (2003); Brent K. Newcomb, Comment, Immigration Law and the Crimi­
nal Alien: A Comparison of Policies for Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent 
Residents Convicted of Aggravated Felonies, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 697 (1998); Sara A. Rod­
riguez, Note, Exile and the Not-So-Lawful Permanent Resident: Does International Law 
Require a Humanitarian Waiver of Deportation for the Non-Citizen Convicted of Certain 
Crimes?, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 483 (2006). 
102. IIRIRA § 321(b).  Today, an LPR may be subject to 
deportation proceedings for an offense he or she committed 25 years ago, even 
if the crime was not then defined as an aggravated felony (and therefore may 
not have been a deportable offense), and the immigrant at that time was pun­
ished in the criminal law system.  Furthermore, immigrants who 25 years ago 
committed aggravated felonies now have no relief from deportation. 
American Immigration Lawyers Association, AILA InfoNet, Press Room, Press Re­
leases and Statements, 1998-1994, IIRAIRA Reform, http://www.aila.org/Content/ 
default.aspx?docid=3545 (last visited Apr. 28, 2010). 
103. See IIRIRA § 321(c) (providing that its amendments did not apply to depor­
tation proceedings in progress prior to the date of enactment). 
104. See, e.g., St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 420 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001); In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516, 528-30 (B.I.A. 1996), disapproved by 21 I. & 
N. Dec. 533 (Att’y Gen. 1997); In re Yeung, 21 I. & N. Dec. 610, 614 (B.I.A. 1996). 
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Attorney General held that the repeal of section 212(c) operated 
retroactively.105  Several courts of appeals followed suit, while 
others did not.106  Eventually the issue came to the Supreme Court. 
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed this question of retroac­
tive effect in its watershed decision INS v. St. Cyr.107  The Court 
held that the IIRIRA amendments did not retroactively eliminate 
212(c) relief and thus overturned In re Soriano.108  Relief would 
remain available to those “whose convictions were obtained 
through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convic­
tions, would have been eligible for [section] 212(c) relief at the time 
of their plea under the law then in effect.”109  The Court suggested 
that IIRIRA had an unlawful retroactive effect on the due process 
rights of an LPR who relied on the availability of the section 212(c) 
waiver by pleading guilty to aggravated felonies.110  Moreover, the 
basic notion of fairness required that petitioners have notice of 
what the law is so their decisions could be made accordingly.111 
And in deciding whether Congress meant for a statute to apply ret­
roactively, the language must clearly state its intention so there can 
be only one meaning.112 
Three years later, in response to St. Cyr, the Department of 
Homeland Security promulgated a rule to codify the Supreme 
Court’s holding.113  The rule provided for the availability of section 
212(c) waivers to LPRs with a criminal conviction entered before 
105. In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 533 (Att’y Gen. 1997). 
106. Compare Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299, 306-08 (5th Cir. 
1999) (finding that repeal of section 212(c) operated retroactively), and De Sousa v. 
Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1999) (same), with Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 
130 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that repeal of section 212(c) did not operate retroactively), 
and Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1998) (same). 
107. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289. See generally Brent S. Wible, The Strange After­
life of Section 212(c) Relief: Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions 
for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 455 (2005); Anjali Parekh 
Prakash, Note, Changing the Rules: Arguing Against Retroactive Application of Depor­
tation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (1997); Vashti D. Van Wyke, Comment, Retroac­
tivity and Immigrant Crimes Since St. Cyr: Emerging Signs of Judicial Restraint, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 741 (2006). 
108. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326. 
109. Id.  Though not directly at issue in the Court’s opinion, the holding garnered 
the same result with respect to AEDPA. See, e.g., Attwood v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 1, 3 
(1st Cir. 2001). 
110. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315, 325. 
111. Id. at 316. 
112. Id. at 317. 
113. Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before 
April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,826 (Sept. 28, 2004) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1212, 
and 1240). 
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April 1, 1997.114  After the notice and comment period, the final 
rule also included a codification of the comparable-grounds ap­
proach.115  Specifically, the final rule provided that section 212(c) 
relief is not available when an LPR “is deportable under former 
section 241 of the Act or removable under section 237 of the Act on 
a ground which does not have a statutory counterpart in section 212 
of the Act.”116  Part III.A.2 discusses the statutory-counterpart rule 
further. 
III. DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR SECTION 212(C) RELIEF 
A. Evolution of the Comparable-Grounds Approach 
The exact time when the BIA first employed the comparable-
grounds approach is debatable.117  This Part focuses on three pri­
mary cases that formed the basis of the comparable-grounds ap­
proach in light of Francis. In re Wadud, In re Hernandez-Casillas, 
and In re Meza each held that eligibility for section 212(c) relief 
applies only to those petitioners found deportable with a compara-
In March 2003, Congress abolished the agency known as the Immigration and Nat­
uralization Service (INS) and created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101, 116 Stat. 2135, 2142.  The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 reorganized the regulation of immigration laws into 
three new bureaus under the DHS: The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Ser­
vices (BCIS or USCIS), the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE 
or ICE), and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). Id.  The Execu­
tive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), however, operates within the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and continues to house the Immigration Court and the Board of Immi­
gration Appeals (BIA). Id. 
114. See Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions 
Before April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. at 57,826; see also Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 97 
(2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the promulgation). 
115. Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before 
April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. at 57,832 (DHS agreeing that to be eligible for section 212(c) 
relief, an LPR must be “deportable or removable on a ground that has a corresponding 
ground of exclusion or inadmissibility” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
116. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2009) (emphasis added). 
117. Compare Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The ‘statu­
tory counterpart’ rule for deportees seeking to invoke § 212(c) appears in the case law 
as far back as the late 1970s . . . .”), and Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 
2007) (“Since at least 1979, the BIA has held that § 212(c) relief is available only to 
waive charges of deportability for which there is a comparable ground of inadmissibil­
ity.”), with In re M—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 642, 647 (B.I.A. 1954), and Sarah Koteen Barr, C 
Is for Confusion: The Tortuous Path of Section 212(c) Relief in the Deportation Context, 
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 725, 735 (2008) (“Matter of T—, decided in 1953, appears 
to be the first explicit use of a comparable-grounds approach by the BIA.”). 
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ble ground of exclusion.118  These cases foreshadowed the eventual 
codification of the comparable-grounds approach as the statutory-
counterpart rule. 
1. BIA Comparable-Grounds Jurisprudence 
As stated earlier, in In re Silva, the BIA acknowledged that the 
Constitution demands that similarly situated noncitizens be treated 
equally in certain situations.119  That same year, however, the BIA 
made it clear that Francis only expanded the class of noncitizens to 
which section 212(c) applied; Francis did not expand the statutory 
grounds itself.120  Thus, Francis served as an important recognition 
and rectification of inequality but not as a change in statutory 
scheme.121  Therefore, section 212(c) relief was unnecessary when a 
petitioner’s ground for deportation had no comparable ground for 
exclusion.122 
In In re Wadud, the petitioner argued that his ground for de­
portation, a conviction for visa fraud, was comparable to the CIMT 
ground for exclusion.123  Specifically, Wadud argued that because 
visa fraud involved moral turpitude and a CIMT is a ground for 
inadmissibility, he was thus eligible for section 212(c) relief.124  The 
BIA concluded the opposite but acknowledged that its dictum in In 
re Granados may have misled the petitioner to make his CIMT ar­
gument.  The court clarified, “[W]e need not determine whether the 
respondent’s conviction was one involving moral turpitude because 
we decline to expand the scope of section 212(c) relief in cases 
118. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257, 258 (B.I.A. 1991); In re Hernandez-Casillas, 
20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 264-65 (B.I.A. 1990), disapproved by 20 I. & N. Dec. 280 (Att’y 
Gen. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(unpublished table opinion); In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184-85 (B.I.A. 1984). 
119. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. R 
120. In re Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728-29 (B.I.A. 1976). 
121. See In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. 
Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 728-29; 
see also Griffith, supra note 80, at 94-95 (“[I]t could be that Francis did not really pro- R 
vide a new remedy, but merely imposed a requirement of equal treatment for aliens in 
similar situations.”); Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discre­
tion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 786 (1997). 
122. In re Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 728-29; see Griffith, supra note 80, at 95. R 
123. In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 185.  The petitioner relied on language in 
Granados indicating that had Granados’s crime been one of moral turpitude, he might 
have qualified for section 212(c) relief. Id. 
124. Id. 
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where the ground of deportablility charged is not also a ground of 
[exclusion].”125 
Perhaps most significant in solidifying the comparable-grounds 
approach was the decision the Attorney General handed down in 
In re Hernandez-Casillas.126  One year prior, in In re Silva, the BIA 
had in fact reversed its comparable-grounds approach, making sec­
tion 212(c) eligibility available to all deportable LPRs except those 
specifically precluded from relief by the statute.127  The Attorney 
General in In re Hernandez-Casillas declined to address In re Silva 
directly but nonetheless under the constitutional limitations set out 
in Francis and In re Silva he concluded that the BIA “erred in hold­
ing that relief under section 212(c) may be afforded for grounds for 
deportation that are not grounds for exclusion made waivable by 
the terms of section 212(c).”128 
The Attorney General’s basis for his disapproval was two-fold. 
First, the Attorney General concluded that the BIA incorrectly as­
serted that In re Silva and In re Hernandez-Casillas were equally 
removed from section 212(c) as written.  Rather, its further expan­
sion of section 212(c) in In re Hernandez-Casillas had no resem­
blance to the text and would “take immigration practice even 
further from the statutory text.”129  In contrast, In re Silva still had 
some connection to the text as it “permit[ed] waivers of only those 
grounds for deportation that Congress expressly made waivable in 
the related context of exclusion.”130 
Second, the Attorney General found that the scope of the 
equal protection guarantee should reach only those who have com­
125. Id.; see also Griffith, supra note 80, at 96 (“If the BIA had supported relief R 
for [noncitizens] convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude, it would have re­
warded deportable aliens whose more serious offenses could be tied to exclusion under 
section 212(a)(9), while denying relief to other aliens convicted of lesser crimes involv­
ing moral turpitude.”). 
126. In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 280 (Att’y Gen. 1991), disapprov­
ing 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (B.I.A. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 
F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion).  The Attorney General may re­
view final BIA decisions either by choice or request. Id. at 286 n.7. 
127. Id. at 266 (B.I.A.). 
128. Id. at 286-87 (Att’y Gen.).  The Attorney General further stated that when a 
“particular ground for deportation has no counterpart among the grounds for exclu­
sion,” section 212(c) discretionary relief is unavailable. Id. at 288 (emphasis added). 
129. Id. at 287. 
130. Id.  The Attorney General also concluded that such an extension of section 
212(c) relief to deportation cases would override the proof required when granting re­
lief under section 244(a)(1) of the INA.  For example, the extension would make moot 
Congress’s requirements such as “good moral character” and “extreme hardship” for 
granting discretionary relief from deportation. Id. 
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parable grounds for deportation and exclusion.131  He explained 
that Francis and In re Silva require “at most, that an alien subject to 
deportation must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary 
relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and, upon 
reentry, been subject to exclusion.”132  The Attorney General found 
the BIA’s “bald assertion” that there was “no reason not to make 
[section 212(c)] applicable to all grounds of deportability” as insuf­
ficient to support its decision to “wrench away even further from 
the statutory text.”133  The Attorney General’s opinion left no ques­
tion that the comparable-grounds approach was necessary to deter­
mine eligibility for section 212(c) relief.134 
Two months later, the BIA first addressed a case involving an 
aggravated felony ground for deportation.135  Recall that in 1988 
Congress first added the aggravated felony ground for deportation 
and from that point on, the grounds have become more elaborate, 
developing into a class unto itself.136  In In re Meza, the BIA ap­
plied the comparable-grounds test to an LPR deportable for an ag­
gravated felony conviction.137  Despite no reference to “aggravated 
felonies” in the various grounds for exclusion, the BIA concluded 
that “a waiver under section 212(c) is not unavailable to an alien 
convicted of an aggravated felony simply because there is no 
ground of exclusion which recites the words, ‘convicted of an aggra­
vated felony,’ as in section 241(a)(4)(B) of the [INA].”138  Instead, 
131. Id. at 287-88. 
132. Id. at 287. 
133. Id. at 289.  The Attorney General concluded that “[a]bsent some super­
vening affirmative justification based upon a requirement of the Constitution or other 
applicable law, neither the Board nor I may depart—or, in this instance, extend an 
earlier departure—from the terms of the statute we are bound to enforce.” Id. at 289; 
see Griffith, supra note 80, at 97 (“The recognition of a waiver for all deportation R 
grounds (except those expressly excluded by section 212(c)) would effectively have 
taken the statute beyond the grounds governing exclusion.”). 
134. In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 288 (Att’y Gen.) (“Under no 
plausible understanding of equal protection principles must discretionary relief be 
made available in deportation cases where the ground for deportation could not be 
waived if asserted in an exclusion case . . . .”).  The Attorney General refused to “go 
beyond the constitutionally mandated minimum by opening the floodgates to all depor­
tation grounds.”  Griffith, supra note 80, at 97; see also Kanstroom, supra note 121, at R 
789-93 (discussing the BIA and Attorney General decisions in Hernandez-Casillas). 
135. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257 (B.I.A. 1991). 
136. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. R 
137. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259. 
138. Id. (emphasis added); see Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 685 
(7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the comparable grounds analysis of In re Meza and noting 
that “[s]ection 241 (a)(4)(B) of the INA provided for deportation for those convicted of 
aggravated felonies, whereas § 212(a) does not provide for exclusion of those convicted 
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the BIA chose to look to the provision of the INA that defined the 
aggravated felony to determine whether a comparable ground for 
excludability existed.139 
The BIA found comparable grounds in sections 101(a)(43)(B) 
and 212(a)(23) of the INA.140  In the former, an LPR is deportable 
for the aggravated felony of any “illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance . . . including a drug trafficking crime.”141  In the latter, a 
noncitizen is excluded from the country for “a violation of (or a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law . . . relating to a controlled 
substance.”142  However, the BIA qualified that this finding “[was] 
limited to the question of eligibility for section 212(c) relief in the 
case of a conviction for a drug-trafficking aggravated felony and 
[was] based on the specific amendment to section 212(c) regarding 
aggravated felonies.”143  The BIA emphasized that its decision did 
not alter the comparable-grounds framework limiting section 212(c) 
eligibility.144 
of aggravated felonies”); In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub 
nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007). 
139. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259 (looking to the “specific category of aggra­
vated felony at issue”).  Courts have stated that deportation grounds and exclusion 
grounds must be “analogous,” “substantially identical,” “comparable,” or “equivalent.” 
See Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1326 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Montengro 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 603, 606 (B.I.A. 1992); In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 265-66 
(B.I.A.); In re Wadud 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 185-86 (B.I.A. 1984).  There is no counter­
part if one of the grounds has a “vastly greater scope” than the other, even if the 
broader ground may include the narrower ground. In re Jimenez-Santillano, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 567, 573-74 (B.I.A. 1996), aff’d, 120 F.3d 270, No. 96-9532, 1997 WL 447315 (10th 
Cir. July 28, 1997) (unpublished table decision). 
140. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259.  In 1990, section 212(a)(23) of the Immi­
gration and Nationality Act was revised and redesignated at section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006). 
141. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
142. INA § 212(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23)(A)(i)(II). 
143. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259; see also In re Montengro, 20 I. & N. Dec. 
603, 605 (B.I.A. 1992) (“[S]ome aggravated felons are eligible for a section 212(c) 
waiver in deportation proceedings even though there is no single comparable ground of 
exclusion based on conviction of an aggravated felony.”). 
144. In re Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 259; see In re Montenegro, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 
605 (finding LPR deportable based on conviction for assault with a firearm and distin­
guishing In re Meza as a singular matter); In re Esposito, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1, 21 (B.I.A. 
1995) (“Meza . . . is limited to the question of eligibility for section 212(c) relief in the 
case of a conviction for drug-trafficking aggravated felony and is based on the specific 
amendment to section 212(c) regarding aggravated felonies.”); In re Blake, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. 722, 725 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
439 
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2. DHS Promulgates the Statutory-Counterpart Test 
In re Meza and its progeny evidenced that the comparable-
grounds analysis was a competent measure for determining eligibil­
ity for an LPR deportable on an aggravated felony conviction. 
From In re Hernandez-Casillas forward, the BIA maintained the 
Attorney General’s comparable-grounds approach, and in 2004 the 
Department of Homeland Security published its federal regulation 
codifying the approach with the phrase “statutory counterpart.”145 
Two years earlier, the Department of Justice published pro­
posed amendments that influenced the drafting of the rule.146  One 
specific proposed amendment stated that in order to qualify for dis­
cretionary relief under 212(c), “[a]n applicant must, at a minimum, 
meet the following criteria . . . [that he or she] is deportable or 
removable on a ground that has a corresponding ground of exclu­
sion or inadmissibility.”147  Also, the supplementary information to 
the final rule explained that during the prescribed comment period, 
the DHS received one request for clarification regarding aggra­
vated felonies.148  The comment suggested that any noncitizen 
found deportable as an aggravated felon should be ineligible for 
section 212(c) relief “if there is no comparable ground of inadmissi­
bility for the specific category of aggravated felony charged.”149 
The DHS agreed with the commenter’s suggestion and codified the 
comparable-grounds approach formally as the statutory-counter­
part test.150 
145. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2009).  Under the regulation a petitioner is ineligible 
for relief where he or she “is deportable under former section 241 of the Act or remov­
able under section 237 of the Act on a ground which does not have a statutory counter­
part in section 212 of the Act.” Id. (emphasis added). 
146. Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before 
April 1, 1997, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,627 (proposed Aug. 13, 2002). 
147. Id. at 52,628-29; see Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal 
Convictions Before April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,826, 57,832 (Sept. 28, 2004) (codified 
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1212, and 1240) (“[A]n alien who is deportable or removable on a 
ground that does not have a corresponding ground of exclusion or inadmissibility is 
ineligible for section 212(c) relief.”). 
148. See Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions 
Before April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. at 57,831. 
149. Id.  The commenter explained that “[f]or example, the rule should not apply 
to [those who are deportable] under specific types or categories of aggravated felonies 
such as Murder, Rape, or Sexual Abuse of a Minor.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Blake, 489 F.3d at 97 (discussing the comment). 
150. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5). 
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3. Statutory-Counterpart Jurisprudence 
In 2005, the BIA for the first time applied the new statutory-
counterpart test in In re Blake.151  The BIA determined that peti­
tioner, Leroy Blake, deportable under the aggravated felony 
ground of deportation for sexual abuse of a minor, was not eligible 
for section 212(c) relief.152  The BIA acknowledged that the only 
possible statutory counterpart in Blake’s case was the inadmissibil­
ity provision for a CIMT and further stated that statutory counter­
parts “need not be a perfect match” to qualify for eligibility.153 
Accordingly, the BIA stressed, “Congress [must have] employed 
similar language to describe substantially equivalent categories of 
offenses.”154  The BIA reasoned that the CIMT ground for exclu­
sion addressed a “much broader category of offenses” than the ag­
gravated felony provision for sexual abuse of a minor155 and 
rejected Blake’s argument that the CIMT ground for exclusion was 
comparable to his aggravated felony charge.156 
That same year, the BIA decided In re Brieva-Perez, which fur­
ther clarified the statutory-counterpart analysis.157  There, the BIA 
denied section 212(c) relief to the petitioner, who was deportable 
on an aggravated felony of a crime of violence—the unauthorized 
use of a motor vehicle.158  The BIA held that the crime of violence 
ground for deportation lacked a statutory counterpart in the CIMT 
151. 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. Blake v. Carbone, 489 
F.3d 88. 
152. Id. at 723.  Blake was charged under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, which is an ag­
gravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Id.  The immi­
gration judge concluded that the types of offenses described in section 101(a)(43)(A) of 
the Act had a comparable ground of exclusion in that nearly all such offenses involve 
moral turpitude. Id.  The immigration judge granted Blake a section 212(c) waiver and 
terminated deportation proceedings. Id.  The DHS appealed to the BIA, which re­
versed the lower judge’s holding. Id. 
153. Id. at 729. 
154. Id. at 728. 
155. Id.  The BIA distinguished its decision in In re Meza and further explained 
that “although there may be considerable overlap between offenses categorized as sex­
ual abuse of a minor and those considered crimes of moral turpitude, these two catego­
ries of offenses are not statutory counterparts.” Id. at 728.  Furthermore, the grounds 
lacked sufficiently similar language. Id. 
156. Id. at 727. 
157. In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (B.I.A. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Brieva-
Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007). 
158. Id. at 767, 773. 
441 
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ground for exclusion.159  Due to the “distinctly different terminol­
ogy used to describe the two categories of offenses and the signifi­
cant variance in the types of offenses covered by [the] two 
provisions,” the BIA denied eligibility.160 
B.	 The Circuit Split 
1.	 Comparable-Grounds Approach: The First, Third, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits 
The courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review constitutional 
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review from a 
final decision of the BIA.161  And the question of whether a peti­
tioner is eligible for section 212(c) relief is one “of law, unlike the 
discretionary and unreviewable decision of whether such a waiver 
ultimately should be granted.”162  In addressing the question of sec­
tion 212(c) eligibility, the majority of courts of appeals follow the 
comparable-grounds approach.163  These courts have rejected a 
more fact-based approach often urged by petitioners, whereby the 
court would have to look at the underlying offense of the deporta­
tion charge to determine whether a comparable ground existed.164 
For example, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that obtaining 
fraudulent documents for illegal noncitizens present in the United 
States and the exclusionary ground for fraudulently procuring a visa 
or other documentation for entry into the United States were statu­
159. Id. at 773 (“Although there need not be perfect symmetry in order to find 
that a ground of removal has a statutory counterpart in section 212(a), there must be a 
closer match than that exhibited by [an] incidental overlap . . . .”). 
160. Id. 
161. See INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006); see also Blake v. Car-
bone, 489 F.3d 88, 98 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007). 
162. Blake, 489 F.3d at 98 n.7. 
163. See, e.g., Thap v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2008); Gonzalez-Mesias v. 
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2008); Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007); Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales, 
483 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2007); Dung Tri Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007); Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales, 
481 F.3d 869 (5th Cir. 2007); Caroleo v. Gonzalez, 476 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007); Valere v. 
Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2007); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2006); 
Soriano v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Rubio v. U.S. Attorney 
Gen., 182 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Jimenez-Santillano v. INS, 120 
F.3d 270, No. 96-9532, 1997 WL 447315 (10th Cir. July 28, 1997) (unpublished table 
decision). Contra Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Web­
ster v. Mukasey, 259 F. App’x 375 (2d Cir. 2008); Blake, 489 F.3d at 104. 
164. See, e.g., Dung Tri Vo, 482 F.3d at 372; Avilez-Granados, 481 F.3d at 872; 
Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 164; Kim, 468 F.3d at 62. 
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tory counterparts.165  Moreover, the Third Circuit concluded that 
“the underlying crime for which [the petitioner] was convicted plays 
no role in determining eligibility for a [section] 212(c) waiver.”166 
The Fifth Circuit reemphasized that the extension of section 212(c) 
relief to those with comparable grounds of deportability and exclu­
sion is a limited category, merely an addition to the certain group 
Congress chose years ago.167  If it is not limited, then almost any 
LPR could make the argument that his or her deportation charge is 
so serious that it constitutes the broad exclusionary provision of a 
CIMT.168  The consistent analyses in the various courts of appeals 
show a wide acceptance of the comparable-grounds approach. 
Moreover, the courts are now simply adhering to federal regulation. 
The focus in the analysis remains the same: a comparison of the 
grounds for deportation and exclusion as written by Congress. 
2. Offense-Specific Approach: The Second Circuit 
In Blake v. Carbone, the Second Circuit employed its own ap­
proach to determine whether a lawful permanent resident charged 
with an aggravated felony ground for deportation is eligible for sec­
tion 212(c) relief.169  To support its reasoning, the court referred 
back to the thirty-year-old case Francis v. INS.170 Based on the 
equal protection holding of Francis, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals became the sole appellate court to form its comparison of 
the deportation and exclusion provisions not on the language of the 
grounds but instead on the offense committed by the petitioner.171 
In 2007, the court heard the consolidated claims of four peti­
tioners: Leroy Blake, Ho Yoon Chong, Errol Foster, and Aundre 
Singh.172  Each petitioner argued that the BIA incorrectly denied 
him eligibility for section 212(c) relief.173  In 1992, Blake pled guilty 
165. Jimenez-Santillano, 1997 WL 447315, at *2; see also, e.g., Leal-Rodriguez v. 
INS, 990 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1993); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1992). 
166. Calderon-Minchola v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 258 F. App’x 425, 427 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
167. Dung Tri Vo, 482 F.3d at 372. 
168. See Dalombo Fontes, 483 F.3d at 123 (“Given the possible breadth of the 
moral turpitude concept, almost anyone could argue that although found deportable for 
a serious unwaivable crime, waiver authority should be interpolated because the crime 
was also one of moral turpitude.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
169. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007). 
170. Id. at 102. 
171. See id. at 103 (“Rather than adopt this overly broad approach, petitioners’ 
eligibility for a [section] 212(c) waiver must turn on their particular criminal offenses.”). 
172. Id. at 91-93. 
173. Id. at 100. 
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to first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.174  At some point between 
1993 and 1994, Ho Yoon Chong pled guilty to racketeering 
charges.175  In 1990, Foster pled guilty to first-degree manslaugh­
ter.176  And in 1986, Singh pled guilty to second-degree murder.177 
Deportation proceedings were initiated against each petitioner on 
the basis that each committed an aggravated felony after admission 
to the United States.178  The aggravated felony provision of the 
INA was applied retroactively to the petitioners pursuant to 
IIRIRA.179 
The four petitioners challenged the BIA’s conclusion that they 
were ineligible for a section 212(c) waiver, arguing that a statutory 
counterpart existed in the exclusionary ground of a CIMT because 
either “all aggravated felonies are crimes of moral turpitude, or, in 
the alternative, their individual aggravated felonies could form the 
basis of a ground for exclusion.”180  The Second Circuit agreed with 
the petitioners’ alternative argument that an aggravated felony 
ground for deportation could have a counterpart ground of exclu­
sion.181  Moreover, the court found “no reason to defer to the 
BIA’s interpretation of the statutory counterpart rule [concluding] 
that the BIA’s comparable grounds analysis fail[ed] to comport 
with Francis.”182 
For its analysis, the Second Circuit first had to determine 
whether deference should be afforded to the BIA’s interpretation 
of the statutory-counterpart rule.183  The standard to determine the 
applicable level of deference is set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
174. Id. at 91. 
175. Id. at 92. 
176. Id. 
177. See id. at 93. 
178. Id. at 91-93; see INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). 
179. See INA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (“[T]he term applies regardless of 
whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.”). 
180. Blake, 489 F.3d at 100.  Petitioners also argued that the statutory-counter­
part rule had an impermissible retroactive effect. Id. at 98.  That is, but for the federal 
regulation, they would have been eligible for the waiver when they pled guilty. Id. 
They also argued that the rule was contrary to congressional intent because Congress 
intended section 212(c) waivers to apply to all deportees with aggravated felony convic­
tions. Id. at 99.  The Second Circuit dismissed the first argument, holding that the rule 
did not have an impermissible retroactive effect because it did “nothing more than crys­
tallize the agency’s preexisting body of law.” Id. at 98.  Next, the court rejected the 
second argument, holding that evidence of such intent was too weak considering the 
promulgation of the new rule. Id. at 99. 
181. Id. at 104. 
182. Id. at 100. 
183. Id. at 99-100. 
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.184  The two-part Chevron 
framework requires courts to first look at the language of the stat­
ute and determine whether it is clear or ambiguous.185  If the statu­
tory language is clear, then the matter is over and “the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”186  If the statutory language is ambiguous, then 
the court moves on to step two, where it considers whether the 
agency’s interpretation is a reasonable one.187 
The Second Circuit determined that the Chevron doctrine was 
not applicable; therefore, it was not required to follow the BIA’s 
comparable-grounds approach.188  The court found that the govern­
ment could not point to any ambiguity in section 212(c).189  Thus, 
the government could not “stand on firm Chevron ground.”190  Be­
cause section 212(c) plainly stated that the Attorney General could 
not grant waivers to LPRs who were “under an order of deporta­
tion,” there was no statutory ambiguity in its terms.191  Conse­
quently, the court found that “[a]ny difficulty in determining 
[section] 212(c)’s applicability to deportees arises not from the stat­
utory language but from the BIA’s gloss on Francis.”192 
With the deference question resolved, the court was free to 
consider whether the petitioners’ particular offenses had counter­
part grounds of exclusion that would, under Francis, trigger section 
184. Id. at 100 (“Chevron’s familiar rubric requires a court to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing should the court conclude the 
agency has provided a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”); see Chev­
ron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
185. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  The BIA is able to interpret and enforce the 
language of the INA through the authority of the Attorney General, the head of the 
Department of Justice. Blake, 489 F.3d at 100.  The BIA may “fill statutory gaps with 
reasonable interpretations.” Id. (citing INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006)). 
186. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
187. Id. at 843. 
188. Blake, 489 F.3d at 100. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996)). 
192. Id.  The Second Circuit continued, “The statutory counterpart rule . . . is a 
creature of constitutional avoidance, arising from ‘the ramifications of a prior constitu­
tional decision of this court, rather than the original statute concerning whose interpre­
tation the Attorney General has conceded expertise.’” Id. (quoting Bedoya-Valencia v. 
INS, 6 F.3d 891, 898 (2d Cir. 1993)).  “However, in Bedoya-Valencia, [the court] found 
appropriate a modest extension of Francis’s mandate in cases where the ground of de­
portation could have no conceivable analogue in exclusion proceedings,” and justified 
its holding “in terms of coherence and clarity, not equal protection.” Id. at 96 (empha­
sis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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212(c) relief.193  Consequently, the court held that the “petitioners’ 
eligibility for a [section] 212(c) waiver must turn on their particular 
criminal offenses.”194  In other words, the court chose to shift the 
focus of the statutory-counterpart analysis from a comparison of 
statutory grounds to a comparison of offenses. 
This offense-specific approach echoed the Second Circuit’s de­
cision in Francis in that the rationale for the approach was based on 
equal protection principles.195  Compelled to follow its own prece­
dent, the Second Circuit concluded, “if petitioners’ underlying ag­
gravated felony offenses could form the basis of a ground of 
exclusion, they will be eligible for a [section] 212(c) waiver.”196 
Each petitioner’s case was then remanded to determine whether his 
aggravated-felony offense could also form a basis of exclusion as a 
CIMT.197  The court deemed its holding consistent with Francis, 
with the Attorney General’s discretionary power as confined by the 
grounds of exclusion in section 212(a), and with BIA precedent.198 
3.	 Repudiation of Francis and Section 212(c) Relief: The 
Ninth Circuit 
In its historic decision, Abebe v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed its long-standing adoption of both the equal protection 
holding of Francis and the BIA’s comparable-grounds approach.199 
Previously, petitioner Abebe was found ineligible for section 212(c) 
relief by both the immigration judge and the BIA.200  On its initial 
review, the Ninth Circuit’s three-judge panel affirmed and held that 
193. Id. at 100.  The court, however, noted that the petitioners’ statutory-counter­
part argument was a failed syllogism: an aggravated felony requires an act of moral 
turpitude; we committed aggravated felonies; therefore, our aggravated felonies are 
acts of moral turpitude. Id. at 102.  The court explained that not all aggravated felonies 
constitute crimes involving moral turpitude and vice versa. Id. at 102-03. 
194. Id. at 103.  The Second Circuit rejected the government’s contention that the 
provisions should be the sole source of comparison and found such a focus on similar 
language “strange” and difficult to measure. See id. at 102 & n.10. 
195. See id. at 103-04. 
196. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).  The court stressed that “[w]hile hindsight 
might pin much of this confusion on Francis, we are bound to finish what our predeces­
sors started.” Id. at 105. 
197. Id. 
198. See id. at 104. 
199. Abebe v. Mukasey (Abebe II), 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per 
curiam).  The Ninth Circuit first adopted Francis in Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223 
(9th Cir. 1981), overruled by Abebe II, 554 F.3d 1203, and the BIA’s comparable-
grounds test in Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Abebe II, 
554 F.3d 1203. 
200. Abebe II, 554 F.3d at 1204-05. 
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Abebe’s aggravated felony ground for deportation (sexual abuse of 
a minor) was not substantially identical to the CIMT ground of ex­
clusion based on the comparable-grounds test it had adopted over a 
decade earlier.201 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc opinion repudiated Francis 
and overruled Tapia-Acuna v. INS, stating “that there’s no rational 
basis for providing section 212(c) relief from [exclusion], but not 
deportation.”202  Instead, it employed a standard of “bare rational­
ity” and offered a legitimate reason for the different treatment of 
deportees who are similarly situated to excludees but for a tempo­
rary departure from the country.203  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit 
dismissed the need for any equal protection analysis and the eligi­
bility approaches discussed above.204  Thus, it rejected Francis, In re 
Silva, and the comparable-grounds test entirely.205 
In reaching this conclusion, the Abebe court explained as 
follows: 
Congress could have limited section 212(c) relief to aliens seek­
ing to enter the country from abroad in order to “create[ ] an 
incentive for deportable aliens to leave the country.”  A deport­
able alien who wishes to obtain section 212(c) relief will know 
that he can’t obtain such relief so long as he remains in the 
United States; if he departs the United States, however, he could 
become eligible for such relief.  By encouraging such self-depor­
tation, the government could save resources it would otherwise 
devote to arresting and deporting these aliens.  Saving scarce re­
sources that would otherwise be paid for by taxpayers is certainly 
a legitimate congressional objective.206 
Moreover, the court reasoned that because the section 212(c) 
waiver, by its plain language, only provided relief from exclusion, 
Abebe was initially never eligible for section 212(c) relief, and, 
thus, the issue of an equal protection violation was moot.207  After 
reevaluating the “complex legislative scheme” regarding section 
212(c) waivers, the Ninth Circuit was able to avoid the debate be­
201. Abebe v. Gonzales (Abebe I), 493 F.3d 1092, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g 
en banc sub nom. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203. 
202. Abebe II, 554 F.3d at 1207.  The court additionally rejected Kormarenko as 
“a dead letter.” Id. 
203. Id. at 1206 (asking “whether [it could] conceive of a rational reason Con­
gress may have had in adopting [section 212(c) waivers]”). 
204. Id. at 1207. 
205. See id. 
206. Id. at 1206 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
207. Id. at 1207. 
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tween the comparable-grounds and offense-specific approach.208 
Rather, the Ninth Circuit provides the simple result that deportable 
LPRs in its jurisdiction who have not left the country are not eligi­
ble for section 212(c) relief.209 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Absent congressional action, the appropriate approach to de­
termine whether a petitioner is eligible for section 212(c) relief re­
mains the comparable-grounds approach, now codified in the 
statutory-counterpart rule.  Congressional intent and administrative 
policy make it clear that the comparable-grounds approach is pre­
ferred.  To disregard these principles of law is to disregard the 
proper channels in determining the law. 
Moreover, the rationale employed in Blake v. Carbone, specifi­
cally the court’s reliance on the equal protection holding of Francis 
v. INS, is faulty.  The facts from which the issue arose in Francis are 
not analogous to the facts in Blake, nor does the scope of Francis 
reach the issue in Blake.  Further, Francis rests on shaky ground as 
a valid immigration decision because equal protection rights are 
rarely afforded to noncitizens. 
Additionally, the Second Circuit’s offense-specific approach 
needlessly creates more confusion related to section 212(c) relief of 
deportation.  By allowing petitioners to argue that their aggravated 
felony crimes of deportation could form the basis of CIMT, a vari­
ety of problems arise.  Immigration courts will be bogged down 
with case-by-case, fact-specific analyses.  The courts of appeals will 
have to deal with the results.  The jurisprudence will be confused 
because of a lack of consistency surrounding CIMTs. 
Conversely, the comparable-grounds approach provides uni­
formity across the federal circuits.  It maintains consistency among 
cases because of its clear framework.  Lastly, as the mere codifica­
tion of established case law, the application of the comparable-
grounds approach is already clear, thereby avoiding additional 
confusion. 
A. Congressional and Administrative Policy Considerations 
Before addressing the flaws of the Second Circuit’s reliance on 
Francis, certain policy considerations that arise with the offense­
208. Id. at 1206. 
209. Id. 
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specific approach must be addressed.  First, by opening the door to 
allow more LPRs section 212(c) relief, this approach contradicts 
legislative intent.  Second, the court’s failure to give proper defer­
ence to the BIA under Chevron undermines the validity of its 
offense-specific approach. 
1. Rejection of Congressional Intent 
As discussed earlier in this Note, in the 1990s, Congress en­
acted new immigration laws, amended current statutes, and re­
pealed certain sections of the INA, including section 212(c).210 
With respect to section 212(c), the progression followed from limit­
ing eligibility available to certain aggravated felons to eliminating 
section 212(c) relief altogether.211  In other words, more LPRs were 
going to be deported.  Thus, it can be inferred from these changes 
that Congress intended for the increase in deportation of LPRs and 
especially those convicted of aggravated felonies as defined by the 
INA.  Furthermore, Congress had multiple opportunities to add 
certain aggravated felonies to the list of exclusionary grounds, 
thereby creating a statutory counterpart for certain deportation 
grounds, but it has never done so. 
In Blake v. Carbone, the Second Circuit remanded each peti­
tioner’s case to the BIA to determine whether his deportable of­
fense could form the basis of a CIMT.212  If so, the petitioner was 
then eligible for section 212(c) relief.213  The Second Circuit had to 
have been aware that this analysis paved the way for more LPRs 
deportable on aggravated felony grounds to remain in the coun­
try.214  Therefore, the eventual consequence of its approach was a 
decrease in deportations.  By extending the possibility of section 
212(c) eligibility to the four petitioners in Blake, the Second Circuit 
directly contradicted congressional intent. 
Interestingly, the Second Circuit had previously addressed the 
issue of congressional intent in Cato v. INS.215  There, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the petitioner’s argument that Congress in­
tended section 212(c) to be a broad, forgiving provision cognizant 
210. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text. R 
211. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. R 
212. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). 
213. Id. 
214. The court did assert that it “neither made a [section] 212(c) waiver available 
to all deportees with an aggravated felony conviction, nor put deportees in a better 
position than excludees.” Id. at 104. 
215. Cato v. INS, 84 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1996). 
449 
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of humanitarian concerns “[flew] in the teeth of the statute itself, 
which unequivocally provides relief only for excludees, and, then, 
only for certain specified grounds of exclusion . . . [and] flout[ed] 
the legislative history, which indicates that Congress intended that 
[section] 212(c) relief be granted sparingly.”216  The Second Circuit 
then pointed out that it had rejected a similar argument in Francis 
v. INS, stating that if Congress had wanted to grant generous relief, 
then the result in Francis would have been far broader than its nar­
row holding pertaining to analogous grounds of exclusion.217  The 
court’s statements in Cato make its complete disregard of congres­
sional intent in Blake curious.218  On the one hand, it had already 
acknowledged that Congress did not intend to grant broad relief, 
which would allow more criminal LPRs to remain in the country. 
Yet, some years after, when applying its own offense-specific ap­
proach, the court chose to ignore precedent and instead contra­
dicted congressional intent. 
The Second Circuit’s rejection of congressional intent in Blake 
not only created a way to counter the increase in the number of 
deportations, but it also created an obstacle to judicial efficiency. 
When the possibility of relief increases, so do the number of peti­
tioners seeking relief.  Because under the offense-specific approach 
it is possible for an aggravated felony offense to form the basis of a 
CIMT and all LPRs convicted of aggravated felony must be de­
ported, it follows that most LPRs will try to obtain eligibility for 
relief.  Thus, if courts were to adhere to the offense-specific ap­
proach, there would be an influx of petitioners.  Frankly, it would 
be a mistake for a deportable LPR not to argue that the facts of his 
216. Id. (emphasis added); see H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 51 (1952), reprinted in 
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1705 (“[A]ny discretionary authority to waive the grounds for 
exclusion should be carefully restricted to those cases where extenuating circumstances 
clearly require such action and . . . the discretionary authority should be surrounded 
with strict limitations.”). 
217. Cato, 84 F.3d at 600 (“[I]f Congress wished to provide sweeping and gener­
ous relief to all deportees with substantial ties to the country, we would have recognized 
this gesture in Francis, and would not have narrowed our holding to deportees who can 
show an analogous ground of exclusion in [section] 212(a).”); see also Leal-Rodriguez v. 
INS, 990 F.2d 939, 949-50 (7th Cir. 1993) (“To extend relief to other classes of deport­
able aliens would only further disrupt Congress’s scheme for awarding discretionary 
relief, which deliberately set the eligibility bar higher in cases of deportation than those 
involving exclusion.”). 
218. Perhaps St. Cyr opened the door for courts to interpret Congress’s intent 
more flexibly. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315-16 (2001).  By holding AEDPA and 
IIRIRA unlawfully retroactive, the Supreme Court’s clarification allowed the judicial 
branch to reinterpret legislative intent rather than have Congress restate the statute. 
Id. 
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crime, regardless of the ground of deportation charged, could 
amount to a CIMT. 
However, such an influx would hamper an already overloaded 
administrative immigration system.  Moreover, the case-by-case 
factual analysis required in the offense-specific approach would 
make for lengthier court proceedings and cause an increase in the 
number of petitions for review in the federal courts of appeals.  In 
turn, petitioners would be held in detention for longer durations in 
direct relation to longer case postures.  Ultimately, administrative 
and judicial resources would be increasingly overextended. 
2. Failure to Properly Defer to the BIA 
It is general policy that courts should defer to congressional 
authority.  In turn, courts should also defer to the agencies that 
Congress creates to handle certain areas of the law.  As an exten­
sion of the Department of Justice and through the powers delegated 
by the Attorney General, the BIA enforces and interprets immigra­
tion law.219  Therefore, courts of appeals must afford the BIA 
proper deference, particularly when it comes to its interpretation of 
statutes and regulations.  However, the Blake court made it a point 
to avoid such deference.  In doing so, the Second Circuit incorrectly 
ignored the general administrative policy stated above and, more 
specifically, the Chevron doctrine.220  Further, when the Second 
Circuit refused to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of section 
212(c), which allowed the court to implement its offense-specific 
approach, the court again made a conclusion contrary to one it had 
made previously in Cato v. INS.221  Upon closer look, the Second 
Circuit dismissed the government’s Chevron argument with an un­
settling analysis that contradicted its own statements in Cato and 
failed to properly follow the well-understood two-step Chevron 
process. 
In Cato, the Second Circuit explained that its reasoning in a 
related case was motivated in part “by the lack of legislative gui­
219. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. R 
220. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984); see, e.g., Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We review 
the BIA’s interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the INA . . . with substantial defer­
ence . . . .”); Okoroha v. INS, 715 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1983) (“This court . . . must 
give deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with 
administering.”). 
221. See Cato, 84 F.3d at 599 (employing the comparable-grounds approach). 
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dance” in section 212(c).222  The court was referring to a situation 
where a ground for exclusion could never exist, but, nonetheless, it 
plainly indicated that section 212(c) was unclear.223  Yet, in Blake, 
the Second Circuit concluded that the language of section 212(c) 
was clear, that is, the government was unable to point to any ambi­
guity in the statute.224  According to the court, because the statute 
clearly stated that the Attorney General could not provide discre­
tionary relief to LPRs under an order of deportation, it had a clear 
meaning.225  This is, however, an incorrect application of the first 
prong of Chevron.  Although the statute is read to pertain only to 
excludees, the reality is the statute has been applied in both con­
texts of exclusion and deportation since at least the 1950s.  Moreo­
ver, the Second Circuit had taken issue with the lack of guidance in 
section 212(c) regarding deportees whose charge of deportation will 
never have a ground of exclusion.  Thus, the statute is not clear be­
cause it does not address its application in multiple contexts.  Nev­
ertheless, the court was able to avoid applying Chevron deference 
and instead could employ its own approach. 
If the Second Circuit had found section 212(c) to be ambigu­
ous, it would have likely run into a problem with the second prong, 
foreclosing the opportunity to employ its offense-specific approach. 
In Cato, the Second Circuit stated that an LPR in deportation pro­
ceedings is similarly situated to an LPR in exclusion proceedings 
“when the ground for the deportee’s removal . . . is the same as the 
ground for the excludee’s denial of admission; thus, a § 212(c) 
waiver becomes available in a deportation proceeding if the reason 
for deportability is ‘substantially equivalent’ to a ground of exclu­
sion listed in § 212(a).”226  This test is essentially the same compara­
222. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).  The court added that “the Francis rule itself— 
which was judicially (not legislatively) crafted—gave rise to the ‘interstitial issue’ [the 
court] faced.” Id. (quoting Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 897 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
Thus, the court shifted the source of its analytical problem from just section 212(c) to 
also include its own judicially created Francis rule.  However, this finessing of the issue 
did not conceal the court’s acknowledgment that there is ambiguity—or lack of gui­
dance—in section 212(c).  In fact, the court stated that “the Francis rule would promote 
‘coherence and consistency’ in the statutory scheme.” Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007). 
225. Id. 
226. Cato, 84 F.3d at 599 (emphasis added); see also Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 
107 (2d Cir. 2003).  Additionally, the Second Circuit held that a petitioner is eligible for 
section 212(c) relief when the ground for deportation is one to which no ground for 
exclusion could even exist. See Cato, 84 F.3d at 599-600; see also Drax, 338 F.3d at 107­
08; Bedoya-Valencia, 6 F.3d at 897. 
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ble-grounds analysis that the BIA employed in In re Blake.  There, 
the BIA held that the test to determine eligibility is “whether Con­
gress has employed similar language to describe substantially 
equivalent categories of offenses.”227 
Although the Second Circuit decided Blake v. Carbone subse­
quent to Cato, the precedential value of Cato makes its rationale 
worth comparing to the reasoning used in In re Blake.  Specifically, 
the similarity between these two holdings brings into question the 
validity of the Blake court’s conclusion as to the reasonableness (or 
second) prong of the Chevron analysis.  Accordingly, the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion that Chevron deference did not apply in Blake 
becomes transparent considering the court had previously used a 
comparable-grounds test similar to one used by the BIA.  Based on 
precedent, the Second Circuit would have had to find the BIA’s test 
reasonable if it reached the second prong of the Chevron analy­
sis.228 Chevron only requires deference so long as the interpreta­
tion is a reasonable one.  Because the comparable-grounds test was 
indisputably a reasonable one—the Second Circuit had applied the 
comparable-grounds rationale in at least two of its earlier deci­
sions229—then the Second Circuit would have had to defer to the 
BIA’s comparable-grounds approach in Blake.  Therefore, the Sec­
ond Circuit’s history of using the comparable-grounds approach un­
dermines its quick dismissal of Chevron in Blake. 
B. Reliance on Francis v. INS 
In 2007, when the Second Circuit premised its holding in Blake 
v. Carbone on the equal protection rationale of its 1976 decision, 
Francis v. INS, the court extended the thirty-year-old holding far 
beyond its reach.  The court’s reliance on Francis is faulty for three 
reasons: (1) the cases are not factually analogous; (2) the scope of 
Francis is limited by the facts of each case; and (3) the equal protec­
tion rights afforded LPRs may be less than required by Francis. 
227. In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. Blake 
v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88. 
228. See Cato, 84 F.3d at 600 (stating a deportee is not eligible for relief when 
“[t]he deportee’s ground of deportation may be one that could conceivably have an 
analogous ground of exclusion under [section] 212(a) but, unhappily, Congress has not 
chosen to include that ground in [section] 212(a)”). 
229. See, e.g., id.; Bedoya-Valencia, 6 F.3d at 894. 
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1. Factual Comparison 
In Francis, the Second Circuit remedied a particular factual sit­
uation where the ground of deportation charged was exactly the 
same as a ground of exclusion so that the only difference between 
the deportee and excludee was a departure from the United 
States.230  Specifically, Francis was deportable under section 
241(a)(11), which stated in relevant part that “[a]ny alien in the 
United States . . . shall . . . be deported who . . . at any time has been 
convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation relating to the 
illicit possession of . . . narcotic drugs or marihuana.”231  He pled 
guilty and was subsequently convicted of criminal possession of 
dangerous drugs (marijuana).232  The comparable exclusionary pro­
vision stated in relevant part that “[a]ny alien who has been con­
victed of a violation of . . . any law or regulation relating to the illicit 
possession of . . . narcotic drugs or marihuana” is deportable.233 
This left the excludee who had departed the United States eligible 
for relief and the deportee who had not, ineligible.234  As a result, 
Francis “expanded the class of aliens to whom [section] 212(c) re­
lief is available but did not broaden the statutory grounds on which 
it may be applied.”235 
In Francis, the language of the grounds for deportation and 
exclusion were not only comparable, they were exactly the same. 
However, in Blake, none of the aggravated felony grounds for each 
petitioner’s deportation charge was an exact match to the CIMT 
ground of exclusion.  Thus, to rely on Francis as an analogous situa­
tion is faulty.  The facts of these cases are not analogous; they are 
different situations involving distinctly different statutory provi­
sions: Francis illustrates how deportation and exclusion grounds can 
act as two sides of the same coin satisfying the equal protection test 
it mandated, while Blake fails to show how any of the four different 
grounds for deportation could work in the same manner with the 
CIMT ground of exclusion.  This distinction makes the Second Cir­
cuit’s basis for relying on Francis somewhat attenuated.  The court’s 
basis becomes further attenuated when looking at the scope of the 
Francis holding. 
230. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1976). 
231. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 269 (citing the deportation statute in force at the 
time). 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 270 n.2 (citing the exclusionary statute in force at the time). 
234. Id. at 272-73. 
235. Dung Tri Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2007). 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE205.txt unknown Seq: 38 24-MAY-10 16:05 
454 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:417 
2. Scope of Francis 
When the Second Circuit concluded that the petitioners’ claims 
in Blake turned on the guarantee of equal protection, it highlighted 
what it perceived as the “touchstone in Francis.”236  The court 
honed in on the “‘irrelevant and fortuitous’ circumstance of travel­
ing abroad recently.”237  Indeed, the trip abroad is what made the 
petitioner in deportation proceedings different from the petitioner 
in exclusionary proceedings.  But, to be sure, it was the same 
grounds for deportation and exclusion that made them similarly sit­
uated, and to be similarly situated is what is necessary to even con­
sider an equal protection claim. 
Equal treatment is understood to be “fully accorded” when 
resident noncitizens in deportation proceedings can seek relief on 
the basis of the same grounds as those noncitizens seeking to re­
enter the country.238  Indeed, “more [is] not required by equal pro­
tection principles. . . . [T]o go further would flatly contravene the 
statutory language limiting the Attorney General’s waiver power to 
the grounds specifically referred to in [section] 212(a).”239  The 
equal protection component of Francis is only invoked once the 
comparable-grounds approach is satisfied.  Otherwise, there will 
not be two classes of similarly situated people having different re­
sults.  The comparable-grounds approach establishes whether there 
is reason for an equal protection concern at all.240 
The Second Circuit broadens the scope of Francis by refusing 
to adhere to the limitations of the comparable-grounds approach.241 
In going beyond a comparison of statutory text, the court oversteps 
the equal protection concerns it had set out to protect in 1976. 
Other courts of appeals, unlike the Second Circuit, consider Con­
gress’s act of leaving the particular language of 212(c) “substantially 
236. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2007). 
237. Id. (quoting Francis, 532 F.2d at 273); see also id. (“In short, eligibility for 
relief in Francis turned on whether the lawful permanent resident’s offense could trig­
ger [section] 212(c) were he in exclusion proceedings, not how his offense was catego­
rized as a ground of deportation.” (emphasis added)). 
238. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 313 (1st Cir. 1992). 
239. Id. at 313-14. 
240. See, e.g., Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] ‘statu­
tory counterpart’ . . . is what makes a removable, nondeparting alien similarly situated 
to an inadmissible alien in the first place.”); Campos, 961 F.2d at 316 (“Campos is being 
treated no differently from any other alien convicted of a crime that is a ground for 
deportation but has no corresponding ground for exclusion.”). 
241. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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unchanged” as an expression of the “continued desire to limit [sec­
tion] 212(c) relief to the listed grounds of exclusion.”242 
The Second Circuit views Francis as sanctioning its analysis be­
yond the language of the statutes or, rather, beneath the surface of 
the statutory grounds, to the offenses committed in order to find 
comparable grounds, whereas the majority of Circuits narrowly 
construe the language of the statutes to find comparable grounds. 
As the Seventh Circuit explained, to go beyond the narrow view 
and “hold that the same form of discretionary relief must be availa­
ble to aliens deportable for different, but arguably comparable, vio­
lations is to interfere again, on an even weaker rationale, with 
Congress’s scheme for regulating aliens.”243  Further, to allow for 
such a distant relationship between the grounds is a failure to act in 
accordance with the boundaries set out in Francis. 
3. Equal Protection as Applied to LPRs 
Irrespective of the impact of Francis, the decision itself does 
not carry as much weight as the Second Circuit purports.  The ques­
tion remains whether LPRs are afforded the type of equal protec­
tion rights granted to the petitioners in Blake. Francis proceeds 
under the tenet “that the constitutional promise of equal protection 
of the laws applies to aliens as well as citizens.”244  But the court did 
acknowledge that “the right of a permanent resident alien to re­
main in this country has never been held to be the type of ‘funda­
mental right’ which would subject classifications touching on it to 
strict judicial scrutiny.”245  Though the court then countered with 
the statement that the Supreme Court has found deportation to be 
equivalent to exile,246 the analogy is not enough to change the treat­
ment of deportation from administrative to criminal.  Factors like 
the plenary power doctrine, the process of administrative law, and 
the interests sought to be protected in relief from deportation cases 
all play a role in forming a lesser scrutinized version of equal pro­
242. See, e.g., Campos, 961 F.2d at 315. 
243. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 952 (7th Cir. 1993). 
244. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886)); see Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Aliens, even 
aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘per­
sons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (stating that depor­
tation can only occur after completion of immigration proceedings that satisfy due pro­
cess standards). 
245. Francis, 532 F.2d at 272. 
246. Id. 
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tection rights.247  This larger question of how much equal protection 
is guaranteed to LPRs leaves many section 212(c) cases, including 
Blake v. Carbone, up for debate. 
C. Offense-Specific Approach Creates Further Confusion 
Many petitioners, like those in Blake, make the argument that, 
although they are subject to deportation for a specific aggravated-
felony conviction with no facially comparable exclusion provision, 
they are eligible for 212(c) relief because the crime committed 
amounts to a CIMT ground for exclusion.248  In Blake, the Second 
Circuit held that each petitioner was eligible for relief if, on re­
mand, the lower court found that the “particular aggravated felony 
offense could form the basis of exclusion under [section] 212(a) as a 
crime of moral turpitude.”249  Two major points of confusion result 
from this holding: how the aggravated felony offense should be 
compared to the definition of a CIMT250 and whether the approach 
already taken by some courts of appeals in removing LPRs based 
on CIMTs is appropriate. 
The term “moral turpitude” first appeared in immigration laws 
in the late nineteenth century, where exclusion was directed toward 
“persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous 
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”251  From then on 
the CIMT language has been part of immigration laws and subject 
to much controversy.252  To be sure, Congress has not defined 
247. For a related discussion on the liberty and property interests of a petitioner 
in deportation hearings, see Brief of Respondent at 28-30, Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 
514 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3717).  The government argued that because he did 
not have a liberty or property interest in the outcome of the proceedings because it was 
purely discretionary, he could not make out an equal protection claim. Id. at 29. 
248. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting petitioners’ argu­
ment that all aggravated felony grounds of deportation are categorically CIMTs, or in 
the alternative, that each aggravated felony could form the basis of a CIMT ground of 
exclusion); see Zamora-Mallari, 514 F.3d at 692; Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62 (1st 
Cir. 2006). 
249. Blake, 489 F.3d at 104 (emphasis added). 
250. One author suggests that the statutory-counterpart rule gives the DHS too 
much power and that the holding in Blake v. Carbone, which allows for some specula­
tion, mitigates this disparity. See Barr, supra note 117, at 755-56.  However, this sugges- R 
tion fails to consider the practical ramifications of allowing petitioners to argue that 
counterparts exist in CIMT and crimes of violence. 
251. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 
252. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 9-10, 21-22 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, 
at 13, 15, 48, 50, 60, 131, 132, 176 (1952); S. REP. NO. 64-352, at 1 (1916). See generally 
Derrick Moore, Note, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void-for-Vague­
ness Argument Is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813 (2008); Jay 
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“moral turpitude” in the INA. Mei v. Ashcroft defined moral turpi­
tude “as an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsi­
cally wrong, or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and 
not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of 
moral turpitude.”253  Another popular definition includes “conduct 
that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or 
depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the 
duties owed between person or to society in general.”254 
These are not, however, the only possible definitions.255  Some 
argue that the term itself is redundant and therefore lacks clarity.256 
And, as one court stated, “[t]he phrase ‘moral turpitude’ is one of 
the most ambiguous in the long list of ambiguous legal phrases, and 
the cases are far from consistent.”257  Additionally, with respect to 
relief from deportation, courts have held that the determination of 
“whether a crime involves . . . moral turpitude depends upon the 
inherent nature of the offense, as defined in the relevant statute, 
rather than the circumstances surrounding [the petitioner’s] partic­
ular conduct.”258 
Presently, immigration law excludes noncitizens who have 
been convicted of a CIMT or who admit to having committed a 
CIMT or acts that constitute the essential elements of such a 
Wilson, Comment, The Definitional Problems with “Moral Turpitude,” 16 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 261 (1991) (examining the problems that arise when one tries to distinguish 
crimes that involve moral turpitude from crimes that do not in the context of the legal 
profession). 
253. Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Ajami, 22 I. 
& N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
254. See, e.g., Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996); Medina v. United 
States, 259 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 2001). 
255. See, e.g., Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406 (9th Cir. 1969) 
(affirming that an act of moral turpitude is one that is “intrinsically wrong”); United 
States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 30 F. Supp. 767, 768 (S.D.N.Y 1939) (stating that 
moral turpitude is an “indefinite term” but includes “[e]verthing done contrary to jus­
tice, honesty, or good morals” (citation and internal quotations marks omitted)), aff’d, 
113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 6 (W.D. Mo. 1939) 
(defining an act of moral turpitude as one that “grievously offends the moral code of 
mankind and would do so even in the absence of a prohibitive statute”). 
256. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232-45 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
In his dissent, Justice Jackson questioned how well courts could define what type of 
conduct is a CIMT without an “intelligible definition of deportable conduct.” Id. at 
245.  The Jordan majority, however, held that the term was not unconstitutionally 
vague. Id. at 232 (majority opinion). 
257. Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2006). 
258. Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Sosa-
Martinez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 420 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2005); Ramirez v. 
Ashcroft, 361 F. Supp. 2d 650, 657-58 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
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crime.259  In Gill v. INS, the Second Circuit afforded Chevron def­
erence to the BIA’s construction of the “undefined” phrase “moral 
turpitude.”260  There, the court reviewed the BIA’s interpretation 
of federal and state criminal statutes with respect to the BIA’s con­
clusion that recklessness, in combination with serious resulting bod­
ily injury and use of a deadly weapon, amounted to a CIMT.261  The 
court reviewed the BIA’s decision for the purposes of removal, not 
section 212(c) relief.262  The court stated, “In assessing whether a 
crime of conviction is a CIMT, the BIA takes the ‘categorical ap­
proach,’ focusing on ‘the intrinsic nature of the offense.’”263  The 
court went on to state that the proper focus is on intent, the 
“mental state reflected in a given offense.”264  Upon a short 
description of BIA precedent where crimes committed knowingly 
or intentionally were found to be CIMTs, the court affirmed the 
BIA’s determination that “attempted reckless assault” under New 
York law contained the elements of a CIMT.265 
Gill illustrates the complicated analysis required to determine 
whether an offense is a CIMT.  Moreover, in Blake, the Second Cir­
cuit stated that a CIMT determination relative to an aggravated fel­
ony “is one well within the BIA’s expertise” and cited Gill.266 
Given the extensive line of reasoning used in Gill and the number 
of aggravated felony grounds of deportation as well as the impot of 
federal and state law, CIMT analysis does not appear to be quick 
and manageable.  Plus, when one considers the undefined term of 
moral turpitude, the numerous definitions from which a court could 
choose, and the evolving morals of the public, a CIMT determina­
tion cannot be objective.  In fact, such a determination will be ripe 
for appeal based on inconsistency, arbitrariness, and subjectivity.267 
Section 212(c) jurisprudence does not need another layer of compli­
cation, which, as evidenced above, is a likely result when applying 
the offense-specific approach. 
259. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
260. Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005).  The court went so far as to say 
that “the BIA has expertise applying and construing immigration law.” Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. (quoting Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 89-90. 
266. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2007). 
267. This hypothetical framework that the offense could form the basis of a 
CIMT invites subjective interpretation.  Since it is not definitive, it is possible that many 
offenses would fall under the framework.  It is a vague and broad test that is far from 
the narrow statutory interpretation of the comparable-grounds approach. 
459 
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Ironically, the Second Circuit is wary of such arbitrary analysis. 
It strongly opposed judicial arbitrariness in its critique of the BIA’s 
rationale in In re Blake.268  Specifically, the court had concerns with 
the BIA’s standard that an “incidental overlap” between grounds 
does not reach the level of a statutory counterpart.269  The Second 
Circuit stated that such a standard “invites arbitrary decision mak­
ing” because there is no certainty as to what amount of overlap is 
enough.270  In a CIMT analysis, this same type of vagueness and 
arbitrary decision making will occur.  Thus, the offense-specific ap­
proach will create problems that the Second Circuit has sought to 
avoid.  Because this standard is based on moral, rather than legal, 
standards, and moral standards change over time and vary in differ­
ent locations,271 it is not possible for the CIMT analysis, per the 
offense-specific approach, to be consistent as applied. 
D. Comparable Grounds Provides Uniformity and Congruency 
The comparable-grounds approach is preferred for two main 
reasons.  One, it promotes uniformity through both its wide accept­
ance in the federal and immigration courts and its significant prece­
dential value.  Two, given the unique equal protection framework of 
the section 212(c) eligibility determination, the comparison be­
tween grounds makes sense analytically. 
1. Benefits of Uniformity 
The federal courts favor uniformity and consistency to support 
the structure and function of the court system.272  “Not only is uni­
form interpretation of federal law assumed to be desirable as a mat­
ter of policy, some judges and scholars claim that the Constitution 
requires federal courts to standardize the meaning of federal law 
for the nation.”273  Though Blake v. Carbone is not binding on the 
other federal circuits, it nonetheless defeats uniformity in the fed­
eral court system and in immigration law, which in turn creates in­
consistent results, uncertainty among petitioners, and the impetus 
268. Blake, 489 F.3d at 102 n.10. 
269. Id. at 102 & n.10. 
270. Id. at 102 n.10. 
271. See United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1939); 
United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (D. Pa. 1947). 
272. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569 
(2008).  Though this article questions the weight given to uniformity, it nonetheless es­
tablishes that uniformity is currently a desirable goal. Id. at 1574. 
273. Id. at 1569. 
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to forum shop.274  By keeping the equal protection analysis the 
same within each federal circuit, legal uncertainty is thwarted while 
consistency in the law is promoted.  Without a common method to 
determine whether the deportee is similarly situated to an excludee, 
there is no way to ensure consistent results.  Even though there is 
no explicit requirement for uniformity in immigration law, policy 
reasons suggest it is preferable. 
Furthermore, one of the constitutional bases for the federal 
government’s power to regulate immigration requires uniformity in 
the related area of naturalization.275  It can be argued that this 
should extend to other areas of immigration law.  In fact, some 
courts have stated that uniform immigration law is of “paramount” 
importance since immigration is exclusively a federal responsibil­
ity.276  Similarly, courts have reasoned that uniformity is important 
in the nationwide application of immigration law.277  Because the 
vast majority of courts of appeals follow the BIA’s comparable-
grounds approach,278 in the interest of uniformity alone, this ap­
proach is the preferable choice.  Simply, the Second Circuit’s deci­
sion to create its own test impedes the goals of uniformity stated 
earlier. 
Additionally, the comparable-grounds approach stems from 
over thirty years of BIA precedent, including an affirmative opinion 
by the Attorney General.279  It has been upheld by the majority of 
courts of appeals and is now codified in federal regulation.  Though 
the approach may have initially been an attempt to synthesize 
“problematic legislation” with “judicial-stitchery,” its long-standing 
presence in immigration jurisprudence is undeniable.280  In answer­
274. See generally Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Im­
migration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 
1700 (1999) (discussing how immigration case law has extended the uniformity require­
ment found in the Naturalization Clause to other aspects of immigration law and thus 
should be extended to the aggravated felony provision). 
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
276. See, e.g., Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“[I]mmigration laws should be applied uniformly across the country.” (quoting 
Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
277. See, e.g., Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2001). 
278. See supra note 163. R 
279. See In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 264-65 (B.I.A. 1990) (re­
viewing history), disapproved by 20 I. & N. Dec. 280 (Att’y Gen. 1991), aff’d sub nom. 
983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion). 
280. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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ing which of the two approaches is preferred, decades of precedent 
cannot be ignored. 
2. Textual Focus of the Comparable-Grounds Approach 
The comparable-grounds approach also provides a logical 
framework for courts to follow.  The analysis of the language in 
both the exclusionary and deportation provisions is critical since a 
“textual link between [a deportation and an exclusion provision] 
indicate[s] that Congress had the same class of offenses in mind 
when it enacted the two provisions that must be compared.”281  A 
“common-sense understanding” of the crimes involved in each pro­
vision does not provide this type of insight.282 
To be similarly situated there must be an evident textual link to 
satisfy the equal protection concerns of Francis and Silva.283  The 
comparable-grounds approach itself is uncomplicated so long as the 
longstanding case law is understood.  The inclination to complicate 
the question of “whether Congress has employed similar language 
to describe substantially equivalent categories of offenses” is under­
standable, particularly when the deportation ground is an aggra­
vated felony.284  However, to do so is to cause a problem where one 
need not be. 
Rather, the focus on similar language in the comparable-
grounds approach is a rational standard.285  While the Second Cir­
cuit found that “[t]he BIA’s emphasis on similar language is 
281. Avilez-Granados v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 2007). 
282. See id. 
283. See Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2007).  The Seventh Cir­
cuit explained, 
[T]he requirement of a comparable ground of exclusion in [section] 212(a)—a 
“statutory counterpart”—is what makes a removable, nondeparting alien simi­
larly situated to an inadmissible alien in the first place.  If the removable 
alien’s crime of conviction is not substantially equivalent to a ground of inad­
missibility under [section] 212(a), then the removable alien is not similarly sit­
uated for purposes of claiming an equal protection right to apply for [section] 
212(c) relief. 
Id. 
284. In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated sub nom. Blake 
v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88. 
285. Cf. Barr, supra note 117, at 757-60 (arguing that the comparable-grounds R 
approach creates arbitrary distinctions at various stages of a petitioner’s eligibility 
claim).  For additional insight on the comparable-grounds versus offense-specific ap­
proach debate, see Michael M. Waits, Note, “In Like Circumstances, but for Irrelevant 
and Fortuitous Factors”: The Availability of Section 212(c) Relief to Deportable Legal 
Permanent Residents, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 465 (2009). 
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strange,”286 this concern only arises in rare situations involving a 
potential overlap like in Jimenez-Santillano v. INS, where an exclu­
sionary provision is written broadly and seemingly encompasses a 
ground of deportation.287  But, to automatically assume there is a 
counterpart is incorrect.  The comparable-grounds approach prop­
erly guides courts in finding the necessary textual link between the 
statutes.  This approach ensures that the intent existed for the two 
grounds to be compared, instead of a judicial reclassification of of­
fenses based on factual similarities. 
CONCLUSION 
Because a circuit split does exist, there is room for either the 
legislative or judicial branch to decide the issue.  Generally, the Su­
preme Court resolves such matters.  However, here, congressional 
action is the appropriate option.  Plenary power authorizes Con­
gress’s control over immigration matters.  As the legislative body 
that speaks for the people of the United States, Congress translates 
society’s views into law.  If courts “tinker” with the current system 
for 212(c) eligibility, they are sparring with congressional intent and 
potentially overstepping judicial bounds.288  For these reasons it is 
that body, not the Supreme Court, that must change immigration 
statutes to better serve both citizen and noncitizen residents of the 
United States. 
Currently, the United States’s policy toward immigration is 
one of heightened protection for its citizens.  Until the country can 
resolve its own conflicting views toward immigration, the laws will 
stay the same.  The courts then must uphold the statutes and the 
286. Blake, 489 F.3d at 102. 
287. See Jimenez-Santillano v. INS, 120 F.3d 270, No. 96-9532, 1997 WL 447315, 
at *1-3 (10th Cir. July 28, 1997) (unpublished table decision).  The Tenth Circuit af­
firmed the BIA’s finding of no statutory counterpart. Id. at *2. 
288. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 317 (1st Cir. 1992).  Additionally, “judicial 
redrafting would serve only to pull the statute further from its moorings in the legisla­
tive will.”  Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 692 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Far­
quharson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Courts are in agreement that “a statute of this detailed na­
ture is best left to the ministrations of the Congress.”  Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 
939, 952 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Campos, 961 F.2d at 316-17) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); cf. Barr, supra note 117, at 755 (stating that both rationales of reliance and R 
fear are not “valid because Congress never contemplated this issue” of section 212(c) 
relief for deportation). 
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policies that underlie them.  If the people decide that change is nec­
essary, it must come from Congress, not the bench.289 
Despite the convoluted history of section 212(c), one approach 
for determining eligibility has remained at the forefront of all sec­
tion 212(c) relief matters.  To choose otherwise is to choose more 
confusion.  The majority of courts of appeals uphold the statutory-
counterpart approach, which is testimony to its effectiveness. 
Though some might argue that the rule is form over substance, 
form is indeed one of its strong points.290  By applying the same 
standard across the country, noncitizens in deportation hearings 
know that they are receiving the same universal treatment.  The 
Second Circuit’s offense-specific approach will only add more con­
fusion to the story of section 212(c).  Moreover, the Second Cir­
cuit’s reliance on the equal protection rights afforded in Francis is 
faulty, allowing for an inappropriate focus on the facts of the peti­
tioner’s offense. 
With the likelihood of many CIMT claims under this approach, 
the courts will be bogged down with highly arbitrary, subjective 
analysis.  The need for a more accurate approach that analyzes con­
sistent statutory language versus inconsistent factual matters will 
quickly materialize.  Furthermore, the offense-specific approach 
creates a loophole for those who have committed a more serious 
crime to be eligible for relief while those with less severe infractions 
will be barred.  The vagueness of the CIMT ground of exclusion 
(and the crime-of-violence ground of deportation) provides more 
room for argument for those who have committed serious crimes 
than those with a lesser degree of seriousness.  Given all of these 
concerns, the comparable-grounds approach is the correct analysis 
in determining eligibility for section 212(c) relief. 
Sara Fawk* 
289. See Campos, 961 F.2d at 316 (“[T]he conditions of entry for every alien, . . . 
the right to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination 
shall be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of Congress 
and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.” (alterations in original) (quoting 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
290. See Barr, supra note 117, at 760. R 
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